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Abstract 
 
Governmental industrial policies have great influence on industrial performances and 
development trajectories. The infant industry theory has been the dominating theoretical 
foundation of the industrial policies in developing countries to protect and foster their 
immature industries. However, the successful application of infant industry theory is 
subject to many conditions, such as the economic and political environment in a specific 
country.  
In this thesis, the case of China’s automotive industry under strong industrial policies is 
used to demonstrate the complex dynamics between policies and industrial development, 
as well as the interactions between government and industry. Especially, the key factors 
that determine the success or failure of the infant industry theory are the research focus.  
The overall industrial characteristics of China’s automotive industry were overviewed. 
The industry was protected and fostered in the past two decades with a few policy 
options, such as trade barriers, joint venture regulation, local content rule, industrial entry 
limit and etc. However, the indigenous industry became highly fragmented, still lacks 
independent technological capabilities, and relies on the international automakers which 
have gradually dominated the passenger car market in China over the time of protection. 
Systematic causal analyses are conducted to explore the essential reasons for the distorted 
policy impacts on industrial evolution. The results indicate the regionalism and 
departmentalism in China’s government system led to the fragmentation, and the 
“regulatory capture” between the government and state-owned enterprises is the major 
reason for the oligopoly of joint ventures and the industry-wide lack of active capability 
development. The uniqueness of the strong governmental ownership in the market 
players in the Chinese automotive industry determined the failure of the application of 
infant industry theory. A further cross-country comparative analysis also supports these 
major findings. 
A few policy recommendations, including ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, 
centralization of industrial management and etc., are proposed at the end of the thesis.  
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Thesis Supervisor’s Official Title: Professor of Engineering Systems and Civil and Environmental 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Government may play a significant role in protecting local economy and promoting 
industrial development. And industrial policy and regulation are the basic instruments for 
the government to intervene and influence industrial evolution. Governments in most of 
countries have implemented various industrial policies, regulations or laws in order to 
protect local markets or promote industrial development and economic growth. 
The governmental interventions are usually conducted in some basic policy forms, 
including trade policies (e.g. tariff, quota and other anti-dumping measures) to protect the 
domestic market that is weak from unbeaten foreign competition, support polices (e.g., 
tax incentives, subsidies, preferential loan, licenses, government contracts) to promote the 
development of domestic companies, and foreign investment policies (e.g.,  join venture 
regulation and local content rule) to create production capacity and employment, transfer 
technology and know-how, and link to the global marketplace. 
The forms of industrial policies vary across countries and regions, but their purposes 
simply centered in two: protection and development. In the developed countries, 
protection is the major purpose of industrial policies. The United States, which is self-
assumed a “free-trade” country, also has anti-dumping measures in forms of tax, tariff, 
quota and etc. to protect domestic industries from foreign competition, with which the 
domestic companies by themselves have no power to compete. Sometimes, developed 
countries also use policy options to promote the development of its specific less 
developed industries. As a matter of fact, the government industrial polices are more 
popularly used in the less developed countries with both of the protection and 
development purposes: to protect their immature domestic industries from foreign 
competitions, and to promote industrial development and catch-up.  
Industrial policies have been widely and successfully used in the world, especially in 
the centrally planned economies like Japan and China to leap frog economic growth and 
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the development of industries, though many of these industrial policies, especially the 
protectionism policies, are always criticized by the advocators of the “free trade” 
principle. Japan’s fast economic growth and catching-up in nearly all major industries 
since the 1950s largely attributed to the successful active government interventions 
through comprehensive industrial policies. And China’s comprehensive economic 
policies under the “Reform and Open” principle also have been driving the fastest 
economic growth in the world during the past two decades.  
However, the success of industrial polices highly depends on the content of policies, 
the specifics of the industrial status, the political and economic environments and many 
other factors. The dynamics between industrial policies, industry performance, and 
government system are complicated. Many developing countries in Latin America and 
Africa failed to attain international competitiveness after 15 or 20 years of protection of 
similar governmental policies, which the Eastern Asian countries took to succeed.  
Therefore, the basic motivation of this study is to demonstrate and analyze the 
complex interactions and dynamics between the governmental policies, industrial 
environment and the industrial development, with the case of a typical “infant industry” -
- China’s automotive industry from the 1980s.  
China has a typical government-intervened economic system. And, regarded as an 
infant industry, the automotive industry was one of the highly regulated industries that the 
Chinese government tried to protect and nurture with a comprehensive set of industrial 
policies1. Many classic policy options under the structures of trade barriers, promotional 
policies and foreign investment policies have been implemented in this case with strong 
Chinese characteristics in the automotive sector. The interactions between those 
individual policy measures have been strong, and generated many expected as well as 
unexpected impacts that each measure can not generate individually.  
Therefore, using the case of China’s automotive industry would be valuable to 
capture the interacting dynamics between the government and industrial development, 
                                                          
1 The reason for many developing countries to pick the automotive industry as a pillar industry to protect 
and foster first is because there are strong spillover effects from the automotive industry to many of its 
associated industries within the domestic economy. Spillover effects from the initially-protected pillar 
industry may stimulate the growth of other domestic industries and the overall economy. 
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and dig the determinant factors within the policy framework to influence the industrial 
development. 
1.2 Infant Industry Theory and Research Problems 
The theoretical foundation for most of the common industrial polices that aim to 
protect and foster industry development is the “Infant Industry Theory”, which was 
founded systematically by Fridrich List2 in his famous book “The National System of 
Political Economy” first published in 1841. And, Alexander Hamilton3 is widely cited as 
the original contributor to the fundamental ideas of the infant industry theory. The theory 
advocates that infant/immature domestic industries in the less developed countries should 
be protected by the government with tariffs, quotas, and other useful means from the 
international competitions for a limited time period until their capabilities reach the 
international level, and become mature and stable4.  
The immature firms in the less developed countries have little chance to survive from 
the competition of the mature firms in the developed countries that have been in the 
business for a long time, operating with high efficiency, low price and high quality for 
similar products or service. Therefore, the government in the developing countries should 
play a role to protect the immature industries and foster its growth. The protections, 
generally in forms of tariff, quota and etc., may result in a monopoly or oligopoly and a 
higher domestic price in the protected domestic market than that in the international 
market. Then the high price may cover the higher production costs and help the 
inefficient immature firms remain in business. With the profits gained inefficiently during 
                                                          
2 Friedrich List (1789~1846) was a German political economist and nationalist. Friedrich List resided in 
America from 1825 to 1832, and there he created his "National System" theory based on his observations 
and the inspiration from Alexander Hamilton's work. His best-known book, The National System of 
Political Economy (1841), was written as against the free-trade doctrines that permeated classical 
economics. The infant industry theory was regarded as first comprehensively developed and formulated in 
this book.  
3 Alexander Hamilton (1755~1804) was the founder of Federalist Party - the first American political party, 
and the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. He initiated the debate on industrialization 
through infant industry protection in 1791, and argued for the protection of United States’ industries against 
imports from Great Britain. The first Tariff Act of the United State in 1789 was regarded as having 
elements of protectionism. Hence, the United State was also regarded as the motherland of infant industry 
protection as an economic theory and as a tool of trade and industrialization policy. 
4 Infant Industry Argument, Wikipedia, June 2006. 
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the protection period of time, the immature firms would improve its experience and 
efficiency that could improve its product quality and reduce operation costs. The 
protections may be reduced gradually along with the improvements of the 
competitiveness of the domestic firms. When the industry reaches a minimum level to be 
able to compete with the well-established industries abroad, the protections should be 
lifted. Generally speaking, the protection is designed to create an environment for the 
infant industries’ initial growth, and facilitate a faster development.  
Even though the infant industry theory is disputed by the advocators of the “free 
trade” theory, it has been widely used in the world, and has actually served as the 
theoretical foundation of the development strategies pursued by countries like the United 
States and Germany to catch up with Britain in the late 19th century, and Japan and South 
Korea in late 20th century to stimulate the economic growth.  
However, the appropriate protections based on the infant industry theory are 
conditioned by many specific circumstances and restrictions. As a matter of fact, the 
developing countries that simply isolated the domestic market for the protection purposes 
used to fail in developing the strength of the domestic industries. Frederick List actually 
regards restrictions as a means to development, independence and ultimately liberty, i.e. 
free trade (Shafaeddin, 2000). The correct understanding is that, it is not contradictory 
against the “free trade” doctrines, but one complement. Besides the basic ideas, a few 
issues surrounding the practical application of the infant industry theory should be 
addressed. 
1) The protection needs an appropriate due and level.  
First, the protection has costs for the inefficiency of the regulated industry. The core 
role of protection is to give the chance to immature firms for their initial growth. If the 
firms in the developing industries have grown to be able to compete with the mature 
firms in the developed countries, the protection is no longer needed. On the contrary, 
keeping the protection in place would induce costs. Secondly, if the protection is 
expected to be long-lasting, then the protected domestic firms would have less incentive 
to improve their productive efficiency. Also the level of protection (e.g. the level of tariff 
or quota) is associated with the market welfare deadweight loss, so needs to be set and 
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adjusted according to the relative competitiveness difference between the levels of 
domestic firms and international firms. For example, the rate of tariff should be decreased 
in accordance with the competitiveness development of the protected industry. The tariff 
should be lifted at the end of the protection when the domestic industry has been mature 
enough. However, to determine the correct protection level and time period is not a 
simple and easy matter (Shafaeddin, 2000; Shi, 2005). 
2) Learning effects must be fostered and generated during the protection period. 
Protection may reduce the need and motivation of the protected firms to learn and 
improve. Without learning and spillover effects, the immature firms are unlikely to 
improve and grow. Therefore, besides the protectionism policies, the measures to 
promote learning effects must be integrated in the policy package. First, domestic 
competition is necessary as foreign competition has been kept out. This is because, 
without competition, the domestic firms will gain monopoly or oligopoly and lose the 
need and motivation to improve its operation efficiency and capability. Second, 
international cooperation and foreign direct investment (FDI) may drive the spillover of 
management and technological know-how to the less developed countries and accelerate 
learning. Actually, Frederick List never meant the protection on domestic market is to 
challenge the international trade.  
3) Not all the immature industries should be protected. 
The industries that have potential to compete with the international level in the future 
and the industries that have strong knowledge spillover function to other related 
industries, such as the automotive industry, should have the priorities of enjoying the 
governmental protection. Moreover, the protection is unnecessary for those industries that 
have rare competition in the global range, even if they are under-developed (Shi, 2005).   
However, the infant industry theory is always disputed. The advocators of “free 
trade” and “comparative advantage” claim that the protection over infant industry would 
split up the global market, induce inefficient allocation of resources, and generate society 
deadweight loss in a global horizon. Also, the immature industry under protection would 
end up with small-scale, localized, and inefficient.  The infant industry theory is still 
widely regarded as the opposite of the WTO (World Trade Organization) missions and 
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agreements that promote a free global market. And such debates and doubts on the infant 
industry theory have never stopped. 
As a matter of fact, not all the governmental policies that have been implemented as 
application of the infant industry theory succeeded. In many developing countries, 
industries have failed to attain international competitiveness even after 15 or 20 years of 
protection, and might not survive if such measures as protective tariffs were removed. 
Mostly, the Asian countries performed much better than those in the Latin America and 
Africa. The reasons for the existing failures are complex, either theoretical or application 
problems, which still need to be further investigated. 
In the case of automotive industry, even though the industrial polices based on the 
basic principles of the infant industry theory succeeded in Japan and South Korea, they 
did not perform perfectly in most of the other developing countries in Latin America and 
Africa. The situation in the Chinese automotive industry is a little complex. After 20 
years of protected development, the domestic automotive industry has been economically 
developed to be close to the international level. China has become one of the biggest 
power houses for the global automotive industry. However, the indigenous firms are 
technologically underdeveloped relative to the initial police goal to leap frog. Similar 
governmental policies and intentions in Japan based on the infant industry theory during 
the 1950s and 1970s drove the development faster than that during the 20 years since the 
middle 1980s in China. 
Therefore, what are the reasons for the inefficiency of China’s automotive industrial 
policies compared with Japan’s successful policies? What part of the policies is 
successful, and what part has failed? Does the failure imply the correctness of the 
proponents of theoretical economic theories against government interventions in 
economic development, and the deficit of the infant industry theory? And what are the 
key factors that will determine the policy impacts on industrial development? More 
generally, similar polices built on the infant industry theory failed, but some others 
succeeded, therefore, what are the key factors that determine the success and failures? 
These will be the key research questions that will be answered through the analysis in this 
thesis.  
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There have been various studies about the history and development of China’s 
automotive industry, as well as the governmental policies to foster the development of 
this industry. Some of these studies have deep insights about the substances of the 
policies, and complex structure and status of the current Chinese automotive industry. 
However, very few studies have systematically investigated the complex dynamics 
between the industrial policies and trajectories of development of China’s automotive 
industry. Also, a few studies implied the inefficiency of China’s automotive industrial 
policies, and the negative effects of governmental interventions in the industry, but very 
few explained clearly why similar polices succeed in Japan but fail in China with a 
theoretical basis. 
This study will focus on the interactions between the industrial policies, industrial 
performance as well as the political and economic environment, and also apply the infant 
industry theory to explain the success and failures that have taken place in the past two 
decades of the Chinese automotive industry under policy protection and promotion. 
1.3 Guide to Thesis 
A brief overview of the structure of subsequent chapters is given in this section. 
In chapter 2, a general overview of the current status of the Chinese automotive 
industry and its special characteristics are presented, including the production and sales 
volume, industry structure, major vehicle manufacturers, technological capabilities, 
industry development outlook and etc. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the complex system dynamics between the industrial evolution 
and the governmental policies of the Chinese automotive industry in the past 20 years. In 
particular, the analysis emphasizes system dynamics and interactions, and the focus is 
how the development trajectory was affected by the policy interventions in China’s 
special economic and political system. The success and failures of the governmental 
industrial policies will be evaluated, and in particular, the key factors and reasons that 
determined the failure and successes will be dug.  
In chapter 4, a comparison of policies for automotive industries’ take-offs between 
Brazil, Japan and China will be conducted to demonstrate how polices and their impacts 
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vary across the national borders, and seek the fundamental drivers for the different 
impacts of similar policy options in different countries. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, proposes policy recommendations and provides ideas 
and directions to further the work in the future. 
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Chapter 2 Current Industrial Characteristics 
 
After a long time struggling, China’s automotive industry has become one of the 
biggest power houses for the global automotive industry. In this chapter, the current status 
of the industry and the industrial characteristics are analyzed. 
2.1 Vehicle Production and Sales 
The automobile production in China was started from the early 1950s with the help 
of the Soviet Union. Ever since then the vehicle production kept rising. Initially, the 
vehicles were produced mainly for commercial and military use. With the economic 
reform in the mid 1980s, the international automakers -- Volkswagen, Chrysler, Citroen, 
Peugeot and etc., were allowed to manufacture cars in China, but only in joint ventures 
with the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as partners. Figure 2.1 shows the vehicle 
production volumes in China since the 1990s5. In general, China’s vehicle production and 
sales have grown about 15% on average every year from 1991 to 2005. Especially, this 
industry started to accelerate in the late 1990s in parallel with the country’s overall 
economic growth trends. 
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5 The sales records were close to production records because almost all the vehicles produced were sold out 
in the China’s regulated automotive market where the demand was always larger than the supply. 
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Figure 2.1: Vehicle Production Volumes in China (1990~2005) 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbooks 
According to the statistical data of China Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
(CAAM), in 2005, 5.71 million vehicles were domestically produced, and 5.91 million 
(including imported automobiles) were sold in China6. The passenger car sales increased 
21.45% to 3.97 million units in 2005, recovering from a slowed-down 15% growth in 
2004 when the government implemented a few macro adjustment policies to cool the 
over-heated automotive industrial boom, which had a growth rate of 50~80% during the 
golden time from 2001 to 2004. In the first half of 2006, the skyrocketing speed came 
back again with a 46.9% climb-up from the same period of previous year according to the 
announcement of CAAM7. Dramatically in the past 4 years, the market size has more 
than doubled since 2001 when the sales were 2.73 million. 
A main driver of the market growth is the shift of passenger car purchasing power 
from institutional buyers to strong private customers, who are becoming affluent. In 2004, 
the personal purchases accounted for more than 50% of car consumptions in general, and 
more than 70% in the urban areas8. More broad reasons for the recent fast growth of 
automotive production and sales include the overall economic take-off of China, the 
government policy reforms, the globalization, and many other changes of the world 
automotive industry.  
According to the projection of Society of Automotive Engineers of China, if the 
overall economic growth of China continues at the current speed, the domestic 
automotive market size is anticipated to exceed 10 million units annually by 2010 and 16 
million units by 2020, which roughly equals the current size of the U.S. market (Chen, 
Liu and Feng, 2004). 
Although the motor vehicle production in China has been rising rapidly, the 
production is still mainly to serve the expansion of the domestic market. The vehicle 
                                                          
6 It is widely reported China became the No.2 largest automotive market (in terms of domestic sales) by 
surpassing Japan where 5.80 million new vehicles were sold in 2005. This is inexact because the difference 
of domestic sales between the two countries lies in the range of normal statistical errors. 
7 Reuters, July 10, 2006 
8 Economic Outlook, August 2004, p28 
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export from China has been rapidly growing in recent years, but it is still limited at the 
level comparative to South Korea or Brazil in the 1980s. In 2005, 5.71 million vehicles 
were produced in China, but only 104,115 trucks, 31,125 cars and 6,439 buses were 
exported9, and the export destinations were mainly Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and other under-developed countries. But due to the pressure of 
mounting competition in the domestic market and the increase of installed production 
capacity, exports are expected to soar in the next few years. Many indigenous 
manufacturers as well as international joint ventures have started their plans to export 
cars produced in China to Europe and the United States. 
2.2 Vehicle Manufacturers 
2.2.1 Overview 
A large base of vehicle manufacturers has been established in China over the past 50 
years. In 2005, there were 117 independently registered automotive manufacturers in 
China. Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the number of automotive assembly enterprises 
in China since 1980. 
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Figure 2.2: Number of Vehicle Manufacturers in China (1980~2004) 
Source: China Automotive Industry Year Book (2005) 
                                                          
9 According to the 2005 data from CATARC, 710,540 special vehicles (e.g., forklift, golf vehicles and all-
terrain vehicles) with an engine volume ≤1000mL were exported in 2005. 
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Motor vehicle production is very sensitive to economy of scale. However, China’s 
automotive industry is observed to be the most fragmented in the world, and an extreme 
example of diseconomies of scale. In 2005 China’s vehicle production of 5.71 million 
motor vehicles were spread among 117 manufacturers. It means an average volume about 
49 thousand units per manufacturer. This is already much better than the situation in 1995 
when 1.45 million output was spread out in more than 120 enterprises. The minimum 
efficient level of scale is customarily affixed at 250,000 units per year for a single 
operation  (Baranson, 1969). However, from the data shown in Figure 2.3, only 12 
individual automotive manufacturing enterprises in China operated with a volume larger 
than 100,000 units in 2004.  
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Figure 2.3: Capacity of Chinese Automakers in 2004 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2005) 
From the comparison in Table 2.1, the Chinese automotive industry is the least 
concentrated in comparison with the automotive industries in Brazil, Japan and South 
Korea during their take-off years. The one-firm, two-firm and three firm ratios were 
calculated by dividing the industrial outputs of top one, two and three firms with the total 
industry’s output. And, except only China, all the automotive industries in other countries 
have a similar trend to become more and more concentrated and consolidated over time. 
Table 2.1: Industry Concentration Ratio Comparison 
Country Year One-firm ratio % Two-firm ratio % Three-firm ratio % 
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Brazil 1959 24.8 42.7 60.6 
 1970 56.1 74.3 91.2 
Japan 1960 32.1 56.1 65.1 
 1975 33.7 63.6 72.8 
S. Korea 1975 54.6 77.7 96.4 
 1986 71.3 88.6 97.9 
China 1985 19.2 38.0 43.0 
 1995 12.6 23.6 33.3 
 2005 9.4 18.0 24.2 
Source: Huang, 2003; 2005 numbers are calculated from CATARC 2006 data by the author. 
The vehicle production in China is not only spread out by manufacturers, it is also 
dispersed by regionality. In 2004, there were only 3 out of 31 provinces in main land 
China that had no vehicle production. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of vehicle 
production by provinces in 2004. 
Table 2.2: Vehicle Production Volumes by Province in 2004 
Province Volume 
 
Province Volume 
 
Province Volume 
Jilin 64.6  Jiangxi 18.4  Henan 3 
Shanghai 56  Shandong 14.7  Neimenggu 0.6 
Beijing 53.9  Hebei 14.4  Xinjiang 0.2 
Chongqing 43.7  Liaoning 14.2  Shanxi 0.1 
Hubei 33.6  Zhejiang 10.1  Guizhou 0.1 
Guangxi 28.5  Hainan 6.7  Ganshu 0.1 
Guangdong 27.7  Fujian 6.6  Xizang 0 
Jiangsu 24.4  Sichuan 6.3  Qinhai 0 
Tianjin 22.3  Yunan 5.1  Ningxia 0 
Anhui 21.8  Shanxi 5    
Heilongjiang 21.1  Hunan 4.6  Unit: (10,000) 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2005) 
This fragmented industry is composed of three major types of vehicle manufacturers: 
1) State-owned enterprises (SOE) that, either make vehicles in their international 
joint ventures with foreign partners or independently, manufacture and sell cars 
(e.g. FAW and ChangAn). 
2) Joint ventures between local Chinese manufacturers and multinational companies 
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(e.g. FAW-VW and Shanghai GM). 
3) Private-owned local small manufacturers which mainly produce economy 
vehicles for the low-end market (e.g. Geely, GreatWall and BYD). 
These three types of vehicle manufacturers pose different performances, 
characteristics and strategies in China’s automotive industry. 
2.2.2 State-Owned Enterprises 
Before the 1980s, all the Chinese automotive enterprises were state-owned. Over the 
years from the 1950s to 1980s, many big or small automotive manufacturing enterprises 
were established by the central government, regional governments, as well as some 
ministries in charge of different industries. Among all the SOEs, six groups are the most 
influential in the market so far.  
First Automobile Works (FAW) was historically the first automotive enterprise in 
China, and was constructed in the mid-1950s. It is still the largest indigenous automotive 
group in China, and the first Chinese automaker that produced more than 1 million 
vehicles in one year (2004). FAW became listed at the 448th in the Fortune magazine’s 
“Global 500 Largest Companies” in 2004, but dropped to the 470th place in 200510. 
Besides the joint ventures with Volkswagen and Toyota, FAW also operates its historical 
independent “Liberation” truck plant and “Red Flag” sedan plant, and a few component 
and part suppliers.  
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) was also set up in the 1950s for 
the “Shanghai” brand sedan during the first five-year plan era, but SAIC gave up its 
independent brands when they set up the joint venture with Volkswagen in the 1980s. 
Even though SAIC has no independent brand, in 2003 it became rich enough to the first 
Chinese automaker ranked in Fortune magazine’s list of “Global 500 Largest Companies”, 
and was the 475th in that list in 200510. This corporate strength mainly comes from its 
strong and profitable partnership with the top two global automakers in China -- General 
Motors and Volkswagen. Recently, SAIC has been pursuing a few new strategies to 
develop its self-reliant brands, products and production.  
                                                          
10 People's Daily Online, July 14, 2006 
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Dongfeng Motor Company was constructed (initially called Second Automobile 
Works) in the 1960s during the Cold War era, as a backup military truck plant for FAW 
which is geographically close to the Soviet Union. Into the 1990s, Dongfeng met the 
trouble that the military truck contracts started to shrink, so the partnership with 
international automakers via joint ventures has become particularly important for 
Dongfeng. In fact, Dongfeng put most of its assets into the joint ventures, and has the 
largest number of joint ventures among the Chinese automakers, as well as the most 
complex corporate structure.  
Other than the top three, ChangAn was a military machine gun producer with a 
history of more than one hundred years. It started automotive production with 
manufacturing licensed Suzuki mini vans and cars from 1984, so far has been the market 
leader of the mini vehicle segment since the early 1990s. Different from the other 
indigenous peers who currently rely on the international joint ventures, ChangAn has 2/3 
of its sales from its independent plants that produce ChangAn brand cars, trucks and 
buses.  
Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC) located in Beijing has the 
advantage of being near the central government, and had the preferential opportunity to 
have the first international automotive joint venture in China with American Motors 
Company (which was subsequently taken over by Chrysler) in 1985. It was always a 
second-tier player until the joint venture with Hyundai was lunched and performed 
successfully. DaimlerChrysler has also been expanding the partnership with BAIC and 
preparing the production of Mercedes-Benz with BAIC. 
Compared with the other top 5 indigenous automotive groups, Guangzhou 
Automotive Industry Group (GAIG) has little experience and foundation for automotive 
manufacturing, but it became an important force after the Japanese Honda and Toyota 
gathered around Guangzhou and set up joint ventures with it. Hyundai also recently 
launched a new commercial vehicle joint venture with GAIG in Guangzhou. Because of 
the lack of independent brand and ground work for automotive manufacturing, GAIG just 
plays an assisting role within its joint ventures. Therefore, the trajectory of GAIG will 
mainly be determined by the trajectory of its partners if the joint venture requirement 
  24
remains.   
With the support of their governmental owners, these big SOEs obtained rich capital 
investment, large operational scale, as well as built up joint venture partnerships with the 
strongest international automakers in the world. In this study, 71 manufacturers11 in 
China were selected and categorized for a comparative study to investigate how the 
power of governmental ownership made difference in terms of capital and resource 
allocation. The manufacturers were categorized into three types listed in Table 2.3 below.  
Table 2.3: Typology of Manufacturers by Political Ownership 
Type Political Power Owners or Partial Owners Examples 
1 High Central Governmental Ministries and Beijing/Shanghai Government FAW, Dongfeng, SAIC 
2 Median Provincial/Municipal Government GAIG, NAC, Chery 
3 Low Private or Collective Investors Geely, BYD, Lifan 
Type 1 stands for the firms owned by the central government and central 
governmental ministries (e.g. the former Ministry of Weapon Industry which has been 
transformed to several government-owned corporations). Beijing and Shanghai 
governments are also as powerful as the central governmental ministries.  Type-1 firms 
have the strongest political power. Type 2 stands for the firms owned by the regional 
governments. Chery Automobile Company owned by the Wuhu city government is an 
example of this type of firms. Type-3 firms are owned by private and collective investors 
so as to have the lowest level of political power among all the industry players. 
Net fixed asset is a measure for firms’ size or capital investment, and the working 
capital indicates the short-term financing of a firm’s current operations. The analytical 
results from the data of year 200512 indicate that the firms with higher political power 
own larger net fixed asset and working capital, which are the indicators of the advantage 
of large state-owned firms in capital allocation, as shown in Figure 2.4.  
                                                          
11 The 71 manufacturers were selected by criteria of: 1) Net Fixed Assets >100 Million Yuan; 2) Working 
Capital > 10,000 Million Yuan; 3) Industrial Output Value > 10,000 Million Yuan; 4) Employees > 800 
People. 
12 2005 data are from CATARC. 
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Figure 2.4: Net Fixed Assets and Working Capital by Firm Type 
The global production volumes in 2004 of the international partners of each 
indigenous automaker were summed up to indicate the strength of partners 13 . For 
example, FAW has two joint venture partners – Toyota and Volkswagen. Then the sum of 
the productions of Toyota and Volkswagen in 2004 indicates the ability of FAW to have 
good partners. The major indigenous firms that have international joint ventures are 
chosen for this calculation. The results in Figure 2.5 below show that the rank of joint 
venture partners’ strength is consistent with the governmental level of the indigenous 
enterprise’s owner. Obviously, the Chinese big three – FAW, SAIC and Dongfeng had the 
preferential advantage to team up with the strongest international automakers. 
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Figure 2.5: Global Volumes of International Joint Venture Partners by Firm Type 
Seen from this analysis, six indigenous automotive manufacturing groups - FAW, 
                                                          
13 The original data are from “World Motor Vehicle Production 2004”, OICA Statistics Committee. 
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SAIC, Dongfeng, ChangAn, BAIC and GAIG – had obvious advantage for capital 
allocation and joint venture partnership negotiation by the power of their central 
governmental owners.  
Obviously, with the advantages of government supports, the biggest indigenous 
SOEs achieved their leadership and bargaining power in the domestic automotive 
industry.  In 2005, the top five on the sales rank in Table 2.4 had sales records that are 
much higher than the rest, and they are all owned by ministries at the central government 
level. The top five sold 3,858,086 vehicles in 2005, accounting for a 67-percent share of 
China’s domestic entire vehicle market. Those motor vehicles were produced in either 
their international joint ventures or independent plants14. In the sales rank of the first four 
months of 2006, the top five groups and Hafei(No.7) are all type-1 firms(central 
governmental level), Chery(No.6), GAIG(No.8) and Jianghuai(No.10) are type-
2(regional governmental level), and Geely(No.9) is a type-3 private-owned firm.  
Table 2.4: Sales of Top Ten Indigenous Automotive Industry Groups 
2006 (January-April) 2005 2004 
Company 
Units Growth % Units Growth % Units Growth % 
  FAW 374,200 28.8 983140 -2.4 1007471 12.1 
  SAIC 427,600 74.6 917513 8.1 848,542 8.5 
  Dongfeng 300,400 28.6 729033 39.3 523309 6.7 
  Changan 267,200 24.5 631142 8.9 579520 22.9 
  BAIC 237,700 11.2 597258 12.5 530993 57.7 
  Chery 101,800 97.1 189158 118.5 86568 -4.2 
  Hafei 98,000 11.6 230051 12.2 205115 7.6 
  GAIG 84,200 28.8 237150 13.2 209551 70.9 
  Geely 70,500 75.8 151366 56.5 96693 30.3 
  Jianghuai 62,600 15.1 154340 18.0 130795 35.1 
Source: 2004 Data are compiled from FOURIN China Auto Weekly, 2005 data are from 
CATARC, and 2006 data are from Zhu, 2006; The sales of the international joint ventures are 
counted in the numbers. 
Table 2.5 shows the 2004 revenues of the leading Chinese automotive groups. The 
                                                          
14 By OICA Statistics Committee, the 2004 productions of the Chinese top six indigenous automotive 
groups without their joint venture partners are: FAW: 587,427; SAIC: 308,665; BAIC: 538,699; Changan: 
418,587; Dongfeng: 442,027; GAIG: N/A 
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traditional Chinese ‘Big Three’ - FAW, SAIC and Dongfeng - still dominate the ranking. 
SAIC surpassed FAW in 2003 in terms of revenues, yet FAW regained the first place in 
2004. Even though ChangAn had a No.3 sales record in 2004, but its revenue was only 
ranked No.6 because most of ChangAn’s products were mini cars and vans which mean 
the lower price per unit. Similarly, the new entrants, for example Chery and Geely, were 
also ranked higher in the sales table than in the revenue table because most of them chose 
to start with the low-end market and cut product prices in order to compete with the 
foreign brands. 
Table 2.5: 2004 Revenues of Top Twenty Indigenous Automotive Industry Groups 
Rank Company 2004 Revenue (Billion Yuan) 
1 First Automobile Works 135.64 
2 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. 119.53 
3 Dongfeng Motor Corp. 96.07 
4 Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co. 46.90 
5 Guangzhou Automotive Industry Group 40.14 
6 Changan Automobile Group 38.43 
7 China Heavy Automobile Group 23.38 
8 Brilliance Automotive Holding Co. 22.65 
9 Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group 10.78 
10 Hafei Automotive Holding Co. 6.10 
11 Zhengzhou Yutong Co. 5.94 
12 Southeast Automotive Industry Co. 5.46 
13 Chery Automobile Co. 5.11 
14 Shanxi Automobile Group 5.01 
15 Chongqing Isuzu Automobile Co. 3.62 
16 Geely Automobile Holding Co. 3.42 
17 Chongqing Hongyan Automobile Co. 3.40 
18 Hunan Changfeng Automobile Co. 2.92 
19 Dandong Shuguang Automobile Co. 2.86 
20 Baoding Greatwall Automobile Co. 2.69 
Source: Holweg, Luo and Oliver (2005) 
Other than the top six state-owned automotive groups, another rising star is Chery 
Automobile Company owned by the Wuhu City government in Anhui Province. Different 
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from the traditional big Chinese SOEs, Chery sticks to an independent development 
strategy, particularly in the aspects of brand construction and product development. So far, 
Chery only produces and sells Chery-brand cars, and exports to over 30 countries. And 
Chery has also announced its plan to export cars to the U.S. market from 2007 initially, 
postponed to 2008 later. From 2004 to 2005, Chery boosted its domestic sales from 87 
thousand units to 189 thousand by over 117%. In the first four months of 2006, Chery 
climbed up to the third place in the domestic sales rank following Shanghai-General 
Motors and Shanghai-Volkswagen15. 
2.2.3 International Joint Ventures 
The international joint venture was a favored instrument of the Chinese government 
to pursue technology transfer and to leap frog the industry. Since the beginning of the 
“Reform and Open”, the government has strictly required the foreign companies to 
establish joint ventures with indigenous SOEs with a share holding no more than 50% in 
the automotive sector. Also, the joint ventures are concentrated in the passenger car 
segment, partly due to the strategic significance of this sector and the fact that the 
knowledge for truck production was relatively advanced in the 1980s when the polices 
were launched. The military truck plants continued operating during the Cold War and 
Cultural Revolution eras. 
The first joint venture was the Beijing Jeep Co. of BAIC and American Motors 
Company established in 1983. Afterwards, the second international joint venture 
Shanghai-Volkswagen was launched between SAIC and Volkswagen in 1985. Shanghai-
Volkswagen is still the largest international joint venture in China with an annual capacity 
of 450,000 units, a size comparable to Volkswagen’s main plant in Wolfsburg, Germany. 
However, in 2005 Shanghai-GM surpassed Shanghai-Volkswagen and took the first place 
in the production volume league table. With Shanghai-Volkswagen and FAW-Volkswagen 
since 1991, Volkswagen group achieved a long time dominance in China’s passenger car 
market in the 1990s by its early-mover advantage as well as government preferential 
support through the partnership with the top 2 state-owned indigenous enterprises, FAW 
and SAIC.  
                                                          
15 SINA Auto, auto.sina.com.cn, various news, 2006 
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Before 1997, only several international automakers gained the car production license. 
Soon after the Chinese government lifted the ban on new passenger car entry projects in 
1997, Japanese, American and European companies quickly rushed into the Chinese 
market. So far almost all the top global automakers have made production and sales 
presence in China, by teaming up with one or two local partners. Most of them rushed in 
after China’s automotive market started to boom from 2001, the year China joined WTO. 
The reasons include the market stagnancy in the rest of world, global overcapacity as 
well as the huge market potential of China, which is the most populous country in the 
world. So far, GM, Honda, Hyundai and Toyota, as newcomers, have been performing 
well in the Chinese automotive industry. Gradually, a complex partnership structure 
between locals and internationals has been established, as shown in Figure 2.6 below. 
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Figure 2.6: Partnership Structure in the Chinese Automotive Industry 
The global automakers have posed different strategies in the automotive battle field 
in China. General Motors is the best positioned international automaker in China. 
Together with its partner SAIC, GM recently acquired several local automotive 
manufacturing enterprises covering the van, sedan, subcompact, and mini vehicle 
segments, throughout the country from North to South. Especially, General Motors’ joint 
venture R&D center with SAIC - Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC) is 
currently the largest automotive research and development center in China with more 
than 1,200 engineers16. General Motors has built up a full line capability locally in China 
and been able to turn the car design concept to development, engineering, manufacturing 
and market place. A few models that were designed locally and specifically for the 
Chinese consumers have helped the sales of General Motors soar since 2004. GM outsold 
Volkswagen and became the leader of international automakers in China by selling 
616,556 cars and trucks in 2005. The China market has also become the largest oversea 
market for General Motors. And in contrast with the worldwide loss of $10.6 billion for 
2005, the China operation turned a net profit of $327 million for General Motors17. 
General Motors consolidated its leader position in China by selling 453,832 units in the 
first 6 months of 2006, up 47% from the same period last year18. 
Volkswagen enjoyed the first-mover advantage in the 1990s, and has the largest 
layout in China with a capacity about 1 million units per year. But recently in 2005 
Volkswagen experienced the decline and an operating loss of $144 million in China. It is 
the first year for Volkswagen to have a loss in China. The sales of Volkswagen slid 25 
percent to 490,180, and also fell to second place behind General Motors. This decline 
was basically due to the slowness in responding to China's fast changing market. The 
easily-gained monopoly in the 1990s made Volkswagen in China less-advanced and 
inefficient and unable to compete with the newly-entered international competitors. 
Recognizing this problem, Volkswagen has reorganized its China operations so that 
                                                          
16 Interview with senior executives in Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC) in Shanghai, May 9, 
2006 
17 Automotive News, 2006 Guide to China’s Auto Market, , Crain Communications Inc. May 1st, 2006 
18 Reuters, July 10, 2006 
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decisions on new models are now made in China rather than Germany. Also, Volkswagen 
is continuing expanding its facilities in China, introducing more advanced models and 
brands to cover the luxury and budget segments.  
Honda is the largest Japanese carmaker in China, and the market leader in the mid-
size sedan segment by its successful American version Accord sedan. Honda's sales of 
vehicles made in China rose 25.5 percent last year to 266,710 units, including some 
exports to Europe. Now it is adding Acura and Civic to the current lineup of Fit, Accord, 
CR-V and Odyssey in China. Honda is the only global automaker that has been largely 
exporting cars made in China to oversea markets. In 2005, 11,047 Jazz, which were made 
in its 65 percent owned join venture with GAIG (25%) and Dongfeng (10%) in 
Guangzhou, were exported to Europe. The foreign ownership cap of 50% does not apply 
to the exportation-oriented joint venture.  
Toyota is the second largest automaker in the world, but just a second-tier player in 
China. Though it is steadily making progress in China, it remains behind its global rivals, 
such as GM, Volkswagen, Honda and Hyundai. Toyota's total sales in China, including 
the sales of imported cars, rose 43.8 percent to 185,987 in 2005. With the new plants 
under construction with GAIG, an annual capacity of 340,000 vehicles in China will be 
achieved at the end of 2006. 
Ford came in late and for now, remains a second-tier player even behind Toyota. In 
2005, Ford’s sales in China jumped 34 percent to 62,925 units, composed of Fiesta, Focus 
and Mondeo. Ford has been laying the foundation for a bold expansion since 2004. With 
ChangAn and Mazda, Ford is boosting the capacity of its Chongqing flagship joint 
venture plant to 200,000 units, adding Mazda 3 and Volvo S40 into the product lineup, 
and constructing a second 160,000-unit (annual capacity) assembly plant and a 350,000-
unit engine plant in eastern city Nanjing. With Changan’s acquisition for the commercial 
vehicle producer Jiangling Motors, Ford also strategically increased its share of Jiangling 
to 30%. Ford's goal is to become one of the top three international vehicle producers in 
China.  
As a result of the strong earnings and the sustainably-growing market size in China, 
almost all the international automakers, including GM, Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota, 
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DaimlerChrysler etc., continue to add investments and expand their capacity in China.  
A direct result of the rush-in of the international automakers in China is the 
increasing and deepening competition. Even though the total production and sales of each 
player keep growing in China, but their market share is shrinking. The shares of brands 
are shown in Figure 2.7. From 2000 to 2004, the market share of Volkswagen brands 
shrank from 53% to 27% rapidly19. According to China Automotive Technology and 
Research Center, in 2005, Shanghai-Volkswagen and FAW-Volkswagen sold 354,336 and 
300,118 vehicles respectively, accounting for only 20 percent of the passenger car market 
(3,271,045 units) in China. Along with the shrinking share, the car price is also being 
rapidly cut. 
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Figure 2.7: Market Share Comparison of Brands in 2000 and 2004 
Source: Dunne (2005) 
The joint ventures helped the transfer of manufacturing know-how and experience to 
Chinese manufacturers, drove the initial development of local SOEs, and fostered the 
growth of local suppliers. In the mean time, the international joint ventures have 
dominated the passenger car market. In the rank by sales in 2005 shown in Table 2.6, the 
international joint ventures took 12 places among the top 15 leading manufacturers. The 
remaining three indigenous companies on this list were FAW Xiali, Chery and Geely. 
Table 2.6: 2005 Sales of Top Fifteen Passenger Car Manufacturers in China 
                                                          
19 From Automotive Resources Asia 2005 and the China Automotive Industry Year Books 
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Rank Companies Local Partner 
2005 
Sales 
Yearly 
Growth (%) 
Ratio of 
Sales/Production% 
1 Shanghai-General Motors SAIC 298,571 33.89 159.65 
2 Shanghai-Volkswagen SAIC 244,746 -30.93 142.67 
3 FAW-Volkswagen FAW 238,322 -20.59 145.26 
4 Beijing-Hyundai BAIC 224,661 55.92 103.45 
5 Guangzhou-Honda GAIG 203,229 9.5 114.35 
6 Tianjin FAW Xiali (Indigenous) / 190,019 46.13 147.5 
7 Chery (Indigenous) / 183,994 112.54 111.4 
8 DF-Nissan Passenger Car Co. Dongfeng 157,516 159.14 94.42 
9 Geely (Indigenous) / 149,869 56.39 89.22 
10 Shenlong (Dongfeng- Citroen) Dongfeng 140,399 57.52 87.06 
11 FAW-Toyota FAW 135,471 74.26 97.1 
12 Dongfeng-Yueda-Kia Dongfeng 105,618 77.7 112.59 
13 ChangAn-Suzuki ChangAn 90,717 -17.57 88.19 
14 ChangAn-Ford ChangAn 62,925 33.54 137.02 
15 FAW-Hainan Mazda FAW 60,057 12.88 84.44 
Source: CATARC, 2006 
In 2005, according to the calculation from the sales data by brands in 2005, we found 
that the foreign brands accounted for 75.7% (sales) of the domestic passenger car market. 
As compared in Table 2.7 with the other major automotive markets in the world, China 
market is most open to the international brands.  
Table 2.7: Comparison of Foreign Brand Penetration by Region 
Country or Region Foreign Brand Penetration Rate (2004) 
China 75.7% (2005) 
United States 41.3 % 
West Europe 26.6% 
Japan 4.2% 
South Korea 2.3% 
Source: IMVP, ACEA, JAMA, KAMA; China result is calculated from FOURIN data 2005 
Firm-level data were analyzed to compare the three types of manufacturers - the 
international joint ventures, semi-independent manufacturers, and independent 
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indigenous manufacturers20 - in micro metrics that represent enterprise performances to 
some degree. The criteria chosen for comparison include: 
1) Ratio of new model production over total production in 2005. This criteria 
indicate the ability to access (develop or introduce from outside) new products. 
2) Capacity Utilization (the ratio of production over capacity) in 2004. Capacity 
Utilization rate partly indicates the efficiency of investments. It is a vital 
performance measure for the automotive industry which is highly capital-
intensive.  
3) Value produced per employee per year in 2005. This is an indicator of 
productivity.  
The results in Figure 2.8 below clearly show that the international joint ventures 
perform far better than the indigenous manufactures, and the big SOEs’ independent 
divisions are better than independent small domestic assemblers in terms of all the three 
criteria. 
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Figure 2.8: Performance Comparison by Firm Type 
2.2.4 Private-Owned Local Manufacturers 
The private investments were forbidden from the automotive sector by the Chinese 
government until the late 1990s. Then after the entry limit regulation was loosened 
around 1997, many domestic private capitals, which had been lobbying the government 
                                                          
20 Type 1  International Joint Venture, 27 sample firms, e.g. FAW-VW, Shanghai-GM, Guangzhou-Honda 
    Type 2  Semi-Independent, 17 sample firms, e.g. BAIC Foton, FAW Huali, ChangAn 
    Type 3  Independent, 17 sample firms, e.g. Chery, Geely, GreatWall 
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for opening this profitable industry to them for a long time, were injected into the 
Chinese automotive industry, which was regarded as the most profitable industry in the 
past 20 years in China.  
There are two major ways through which the new private investors chose to enter the 
Chinese automotive industry.  
1) Transformation of motorcycle companies (e.g., Geely and Lifan). Severe 
overcapacity has existed in China’s motorcycle industry for a few years. The 
expansion of automotive market provided the motorcycle companies with new 
business opportunities. And the experience of producing motorcycles is their 
advantage to make this transition. 
2) New automotive companies funded by investors from other industries, mainly 
consumer electronics industry. (e.g., Bird, Aux and BYD). Having accumulated 
enough initial capital and been confronted with the furious competition in 
China’s relatively mature consumer and household electronics market, a few 
consumer electronics companies invested in the automobile sector when the 
automobile market exploded after 2000. Because of the lack of automotive 
manufacturing experience, they mainly chose to acquire and reorganize small 
entire vehicle manufacturers or suppliers. 
Although the private firms have entered the automotive industry, they still stay at a 
disadvantaged position in front of the SOEs. According to “Selling China”, China’s 
political and legal institutions have actually discriminated and marginalized the private 
firms, not only in the automotive industry, but also in most of the industries. The SOEs 
can easily obtain preferential low rate loans or tax exemption as well as the partnership 
with the strongest international automakers. As indicated in Figure 2.4, the government 
allocates nation’s financial and economic resources to SOEs while denying the same 
resources to the indigenous private firms, partly because substantially, the private firms 
are competitors of the SOEs which are the property directly managed by the governments. 
A few private firms which entered the market around 2000, for example, Aux and 
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Bird21, have already quit. They lack the experience of automotive manufacturing as well 
as enough financial and technological resources, and entered the market at a bad time 
when the competition had become very furious. So they failed to grab a sufficient share 
to survive among the strong SOEs and international automotive giants. 
Geely is a rare case of healthy private automotive manufacturers, and has posed a 
strong expansion trajectory in the Chinese automotive industry. Geely was the first 
private automaker that was authorized to produce and sell cars in China in 1997, as well 
as the only private one on the top-ten list of sales in 2004 and 2005 with the other 
international joint ventures and SOEs. The first Geely car rolled out of the assembly line 
in 1998 and the automotive business become profitable from 2002. In 2003, Geely made 
the revenue of 4.35 billion Yuan (about US $543 million) with a profit 130 million Yuan 
(about US $16.25 million) by selling 80,058 cars (Lu, 2005). 
Geely was based in Zhejiang province, and was a major motor cycle maker there. 
Zhejiang is the largest automotive supplier base in China. The local automotive supplier 
base in Zhejiang as well as the suppliers of Geely motor cycles provided a good basis for 
Geely to make economic cars. Geely has tried to develop car models by itself since its 
establishment. Without enough engineering force at the beginning, Geely imitated a few 
existing models for its first batch of cars. Afterwards, by advertising the slogan of “To 
Make Chinese Cars”, Geely successfully attracted a few experienced engineers and 
managers from the SOEs and International Joint Ventures, including former director of 
FAW R&D center, former deputy director of the technology department center of Tianjin 
Automotive Industry Corporation (merged into FAW group in 2002), former deputy 
director of Dongfeng Automotive Research Institute, former director and chief engineer 
of Nanjing-Fiat Engineering Center, and etc. After making rich profits during the golden 
time of China’s automotive market from 2000 to 2004, Geely has been able to hire 
technology suppliers from South Korea, Italy and Germany to originally develop Geely 
cars. Now Geely has 3 manufacturing plants and 6 product series, sold 151,366 
domestically and exported about 7,000 vehicles in 2005. Recently in 2005, Geely 
announced its plan to export cars to the U.S. and Europe, and have increased its presence 
                                                          
21 Aux is a major maker of household consumer electronics and electrical device, and Bird is a famous 
mobile phone maker in China. 
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in the international auto shows, including the 2005 Frankfurt and 2006 Detroit Auto 
shows. Moreover, in order to raise capitals for future expansion, Geely has successfully 
been listed publicly on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange market since 2005 (Lu, 2005). 
Another promising private car maker is Lifan, which is the largest private motor 
cycle producer in China. Lifan entered the automotive industry by the way of acquiring 
several local small truck and special vehicle makers in 2004. At that time, a few private 
investors have begun to quit. Lifan’s confidence comes from its successful experience in 
the motor cycle industry. Its car manufacturing plant was established one year ago in 
Chongqing near the ChangAn Ford joint venture plant, but just obtained the car 
production permission from the central government in early 2006. The inspection process 
took about 2 years. Lifan also persists in a self-reliant strategy, and Lifan 520, the first 
sedan model currently sold in the market, was a wholly indigenously self-developed 
model. Its designs and developments were sourced from various domestic university 
laboratories, automotive research centers, technological suppliers and designers. 
According to the statement of a Lifan executive, due to the competition and stagnancy of 
China’s economic car market segment, the current Lifan cars are targeted at the 
consumers in the small cities of China and South Eastern Asian market. In fact, a large 
amount of Lifan motor cycles are being sold in South Eastern Asia where Lifan has a 
sophisticated sales and distribution network. Also surprisingly, according to New York 
Times, Lifan is negotiating to acquire the joint venture engine plant of BMW and 
DaimlerChrysler in Brazil22. Lifan’s ambition to compete with the established automakers 
in this competitive industry is well illustrated by its strange slogan engraved on the wall 
toward the highway out of its flagship assembly plant in Chongqing: “Why Are We 
Needed Since Hondas and Santanas Are Everywhere?” These entrepreneurial private 
firms clearly know where they stand and keep thinking about what they should do for 
breaking into the competitive and established automotive industry.  
These private firms, together with Chery, Brilliance and other newly entrants, have 
some general similarities and are different from the large SOEs. Because of being tiny, 
intrepid and ambitious, these young and independent Chinese automotive companies are 
                                                          
22 New York Times, Feb 17, 2006  
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called “young tigers” by the international media. 
2.3 The Rise of Independent Indigenous Manufacturers 
Those young tigers mostly entered the automotive market after 1997 when the ban on 
new entry was lifted by the government. The fast growth of China’s economy and the 
skyrocketing domestic automobile market provided these young and tiny companies with 
a fantastic surviving environment. They have broken into an industry highly driven by the 
scale and experience, and some of them have thrived among the large state-owned 
automakers and their foreign partners. Table 2.8 shows the production and sales of the 
major notable “young tigers” in 2004 and 2005. Chery and Geely are obviously the 
leaders, and the both have been among the top ten car makers in China by sales since 
2004. 
Table 2.8: Production and Sales of “Young Tigers” 
2005 Growth 2004 
Company Production 
(Units) 
Sales 
(Units) 
Production 
(%) 
Sales 
(%) 
Production 
(Units) 
Sales 
(Units) 
Chery 185,588 189,158 133.3 118.5% 79,565 86,568 
Geely 149,532 151,366 63.0% 56.5% 91,744 96,693 
Brilliance 109,505 122,646 -0.9% 23.2% 110,505 99,572 
GreatWall 67,657 64,569 23.2% 17.2% 54,904 55,091 
ZhongXing 25,450 25,153 -7.6% -10.5% 27,536 28,114 
BYD 11,236 11,171 -34.8% -37.6% 17,245 17,900 
LiFan 7,836 6,099 569.7% 414.2% 1,170 1,186 
ChunLan 1,369 1,311 -59.0% -60.0% 3,339 3,279 
Source: CATARC, 2006 
Among those “Young Tigers”, Chery and Brilliance are SOEs. They are grouped 
with other indigenous private automakers instead of with such large SOEs as FAW, SAIC 
and Dongfeng because they have posed different strategies and trajectories from those 
long-time established SOEs, and been operating as entrepreneurially as a private firm.  
The young tigers take many strategies on the opposite of the big SOEs and the 
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international joint ventures. First, they all have their own brands and develop their own 
products independently by all means. They attracted engineers from the laggard state-
owned companies, developed car models under its own managerial control by a 
combination of ways, including joint development, R&D job outsourcing or reverse 
engineering. For example, in order to cut the costs of product development, Geely, Chery 
and etc. similarly developed their initial products by reverse engineering approaches. 
After accumulating plenteous capital, they have been able to outsource the tasks of new 
product development to experienced foreign companies, or to jointly develop new 
products with them. Generally speaking, the obvious strategy of young tigers is to build 
their own brands which can generate future value, and to develop their engineering force 
and technical capabilities via reverse engineering or joint R&D activities with specialized 
automotive technology suppliers. 
Second, their products are mostly budget cars priced very cheaply and aimed at the 
low-end market, because low end cars require less sophisticated technologies, and are 
also more appropriate for the Chinese consumers’ purchasing ability. Those cheap cars 
are favored by the price-sensitive Chinese consumers, most of who are buying their first 
car. 
In addition, the “young tigers” are dedicated to expanding internationally (Luo, 
2005a). Compared with the joint ventures which are managed in accordance with the 
international partners’ global strategies, they have more flexibility and autonomy to 
explore oversea markets in the global range. Although the current exports of the “young 
tigers” mostly go to the markets of the less developed countries due to the limited quality 
and brand power of their products, they have been preparing to enter the developed 
countries’ competitive markets as well. Chery and Geely have announced their plans to 
sell cars in the United States and Europe. For the example of Chery, it has been dedicated 
to exports since its official establishment. From the first export deal of 1,000 cars to Syria, 
Chery has exported cars to more than 30 countries, and sold about 18,000 cars in oversea 
markets in 2005. In January 2005, Chery signed a contract with the American company 
Visionary Vehicles LLC for exporting to the United States. Their first-step plan is to sell 5 
models and 250,000 cars from 2007. The introduction has been postponed to 2008 later. 
Chery and Visionary Vehicles have worked together with an innovative business plan to 
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collect capital to support Chery for developing and producing U.S.-targeted car models. 
To make this ambitious venture happen, they aim to involve the potential dealers as 
investors and shareholders. They also aim to attract international banks and investors to 
be stakeholders. Strikingly billionaire investor George Soros is said to invest $200 
million to back Chery to design, develop, produce and distribute cars in the United States, 
according to Automotive News23. Now, both Chery and Geely are in the process of 
improving their products to meet the stringent safety and environment criteria and get 
approvals from regulators of those developed countries, such as Department of 
Transportation and Environment Protection Agency in the United States. Some other 
“young tigers”, including GreatWall, Zhongxing and Brilliance, are concentrating on 
exploring the European and Russian markets where the economic cars are more popular 
than in the United States.  
Besides direct exports, the “young tigers” are also setting up CKD plants jointly with 
local partners in other developing countries. For example, Zhongxing has three plants in 
Egypt, Viet Nam and Turkey and plans to build more in North Africa and South America 
to assemble its self-owned brand of pickups and SUVs (Sport Utility Vehicle). Chery 
assembles cars in Iran and Russia. Assembling automobiles in developing countries may 
help skip the import tariff and enjoy even cheaper land and labor than those in China. The 
CKD plants, which add local employments, are also welcomed by the governments of 
those underdeveloped countries. 
The development strategies in common of the “young tigers” are summarized in the 
casual networks in Appendix A. 
The emergence of these young and independent companies, as well as their self-
reliant strategies for brand construction, product development and exportation, has 
generated strong effects of externality over the rest of the industry. The fast development 
of young tigers and the corresponding favor from the public and the media have made the 
central government aware of the importance of self reliance for China’s automotive 
industry. In the new “Automotive Industry Policy” released on June 1st 2004, the 
government promised to support companies with self-reliant operations and self-
                                                          
23 Alysha Webb and Gail Kachadourian. “China’s New Heavy Hitter”, Automotive News, June 12, 2006 
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developed products with intellectual property, and companies that are dedicated to 
exporting. This policy transformation has driven the big SOEs to develop independent 
operations by various ways. For example, the strategy of SAIC is to establish its own 
independent competitiveness in product technologies by acquiring foreign experienced 
companies with poor financial conditions and good product development capabilities. 
SAIC has taken over 48.92% share holdings of Ssangyong Motors (South Korea’s fourth 
largest automaker) with US$500 million as well as the intellectual property rights of two 
car models and several engines with 67 million British Pounds from MG Rover(Holweg 
and Oliver, 2005). Different from SAIC, FAW is pursuing to strengthen its truck brand 
“Liberation” and sedan brand “Red Flag” which are both self-developed and have a 50 
year history. So FAW chooses to apply its own R&D capability to develop its own brands 
with the help from the foreign partners including Volkswagen and Toyota. Moreover, with 
the pressure from the exportation pursuits of the young tigers, the government also 
pressures its SOEs to export or to operate globally. For example, FAW exported more 
than 10,000 self-branded vehicles in 2004, including “Liberation” trucks and “Red Flag” 
sedans. Moreover, the joint ventures, for example Guangzhou Honda, also have begun to 
export small amounts to Europe and other regions.  
Another extreme case, which may demonstrate the SOEs’ changing strategies from 
indolent to ambitious, is the Nanjing Automobile Corporation24. This small SOE has little 
influence even in China’s domestic automotive industry, but purchased the 83-year old 
MG Rover for £53 million in 200525. More surprisingly, on July 12, 2006, it announced 
their ambition to become a global enterprise through a complex plan to build sedans at 
Nanjing of China, MG roadsters at Longbridge in England and TF coupes at Ardmore of 
Oklahoma in the United States from 2007, backed by capitals from the state and local 
governments as well as private investors26.  
The “young tigers” burgeoned and grew up during the boom of China’s automotive 
                                                          
24 Nanjing Automobile Corporation is small company owned by the Nanjing local government, and 
assembles trucks and Fiat cars (in 35,832 units in 2005).  
25 Rover brand is still owned by BMW group and the intellectual property rights of Rover 25 and 75 models 
and a few engines are own by SAIC. 
26 Greg Migliore. "Nanjing Automobile to build MGs at 3 sites, including Oklahoma", Automotive News, 
July 12, 2006 
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industry from 2001 to 2004, and have become a positive power to optimize the 
competition environment and accelerate the maturation process of China’s automotive 
industry. However, currently they have to face the mounting competition in China’s 
automotive market. Also, their ambitious expansion is testing the managerial capabilities 
of these automotive novices although they operate well so far. 
2.4 Technological Capabilities 
2.4.1 Historical Lack of Technological Capabilities 
China’s automotive industry started with the technological assistance from the Soviet 
Union in the 1950s, and First Automobile Works was an example of the help from the 
Soviet Union. However during the 1960s, the relationship between China and the Soviet 
Union worsened. Then the Soviet Union withdrew 1,390 experts, terminated 3,343 
contracts, ended their assistance and asked China to pay back all the debts. So China had 
to rely on her own resources for the later industry development. Afterwards, the Cultural 
Revolution started, and China’s economy and industries degenerated. Therefore, when 
the era entered the 1980s, the technological capabilities of the SOEs were still stagnant at 
the level as low as that in the 1950s, although many military truck plants were 
constructed during the cold war era from 1960 to 198027. 
So far, even though China no longer relies on vehicle imports, it still relies on the 
indraught of foreign design and core technological know-how. Since the early 1980s 
when China started the economic reform, governmental policies, such as the joint venture 
regulation and local content rate rule, had been implemented to foster technology transfer 
from the international automotive makers, and to develop indigenous R&D capabilities. 
The government also required the joint ventures and the SOEs to set up R&D centres and 
conduct product development activities. Most of them complied and have established 
R&D centres of their own. However, there is very limited product development activity 
in these centres, according to the observations of IMVP researchers during their visits 
                                                          
27 During the same time of the Culture Revolution, frequent border conflicts between China and the Soviet 
Union, India took place. In 1965 China became involved in the Vietnam War, supporting North Vietnam 
against USA.  In preparation for wars, China set up a series of heavy and medium truck plants. These 
factories were located in the mountain areas (away from the borders) and included the Second Automobile 
Works, the Sichuan Automobile Works and the Shanxi Automobile Works, and etc.  
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China in 2005 (Matthias, Luo and Oliver, 2005). And it seems that the function of most of 
these R&D centres is to act as showcases of compliance with governmental policies. The 
policies are seen to fail.  So far, the historical lack of R&D capabilities still manifests 
itself in the SOEs’ reliance on their international joint venture partners or license 
providers who have product designs as well as production know-how, and also in the 
reverse engineering activities of the independent young indigenous manufacturers. As 
indicated in Table 2.7 about the penetration rate of foreign brands, the car models made 
and sold in China are still mainly introduced from outside. 
In particular, on the other hand, without experienced partners and easy access to car 
models, the R&D activities at the small independent automakers are more practical and 
profit-driven, and historically were mostly based on reverse engineering of existing 
models and components in the past few years.  
2.4.2 Intellectual Property Issues 
Unlike the international joint ventures that have easy access to the product model 
warehouse of the international automotive giants, the independent young Chinese car 
makers, mostly young tigers, had to struggle for good products to manufacture, without 
mature product development capabilities at their initial growth stage. During the period 
of market explosion from 2000 to 2004, in order to rapidly capture the market share, the 
young Chinese automakers took reverse engineering approaches to develop cars and put 
into the market very quickly. Afterward, a few intellectual property disputes arose, and a 
number of young tigers, including Geely, Chery, Shuanghuan, Great Wall and etc, have 
been accused of copyright infringement, patent right infringement or unfair competition 
issues for their reverse engineered car models. 
The first case was related to Shuanghuan Automobile Company in Hebei province. In 
November 2003, Honda filed a lawsuit with the People's Senior Court of Beijing against 
Shuanghuan, alleging the Laibao SRV of Shuanghuan copied its CR-V, and asking for a 
compensation of 100 million Yuan (US $12 million). But no hearing was ever reportedly 
held at the court. Nissan also claimed that the Sing SUV of Great Wall Motor Company 
copied the design of its Frontier pickup sold in the United States. However, Great Wall 
Motor Company owned a few deign and application patents for its products including the 
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Sing SUV, and retorted that its products were developed and produced on its own, instead 
of copies of others28. The most famous case was that General Motors sued Chery in 2004 
for Chery’s QQ subcompact as a copy of GM Chevrolet Spark (also called Daewoo Matiz 
in other countries), as shown in Figure 2.9, and had also filed lawsuits trying to prevent 
Chery from selling QQ in various markets, including Asia and Eastern Europe. Chery QQ 
has outsold GM Spark since the beginning with an earlier lunch time, much cheaper price 
and even better quality evaluation from J.D. Power than the Spark (Luo, 2005a).  
 
QQ                                                                Spark 
Figure 2.9: Chery QQ and GM Chevrolet Spark 
It was difficult for General Motors to win this case as Chery had been granted the 
design patent of QQ and a few technical patents as well in early 2003, while GM Spark 
design was never patented in China, so was not protected by China's intellectual property 
laws. Both companies reached a settlement resolving all related legal disputes on Chery 
QQ and GM Spark in 200529. Details are not open to the public. 
Regardless of the results for these lawsuits, the intellectual property dissensions have 
been decreasing. The reason is not that the government tightened intellectual property 
protection, but the reverse engineering is gradually being given up. After accumulating 
enough capital and experience, the “young tigers” have already been able to conduct 
original product development with the cooperation of international automotive 
technology suppliers from Italy, Germany, Japan, Austria and etc. For example, Chery 
has been locally designing cars with Pininfarina from Italy and developing Chery badge 
engines collaboratively with AVL from Austria. 
2.4.3 Strategies to Technological Independence 
                                                          
28 China Daily, December 18, 2004 
29 Xinhua News, November. 18, 2005 
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Although the independent indigenous technological capabilities were not 
successfully established in the past 20 years of initial development of the industry, the 
indigenous automotive manufacturers have accumulated rich capital that could help them 
develop R&D capabilities and loose the reliance on foreign designs in the future. After 
2000, driven by the ambitious government that promotes indigenous technologies, as well 
as the pressure of market competition, most of the Chinese companies, have started to 
take measures to develop or “acquire” technological capabilities by all means. Based on 
interviews and literature reviews, the strategies of the indigenous automakers to develop 
technological capabilities are summarized into three major types: 
1) Self-reliant “Learning By Doing” 
Most of the young independent companies, for example Chery and Geely, started 
with reverse engineered products, but now are expanding to joint product developments 
with international technology companies like AVL, Pininfarina, Ricardo and Bertone 
(Luo, 2005a). They keep the managerial power in the R&D projects and expect to train 
local engineers through such a process of “leaning by doing” with cooperation from 
outside. For example, with AVL Chery has jointly developed 18 up-to-date engine models, 
from 0.8L to 4.2L at Chery R&D centre at Wuhu City, of which all meet the Euro IV 
emission standard. Especially, Chery fully owns the intellectual property of these engines. 
2) Hybrid of “Technology Transfer” and “Learning By Doing” 
Some large SOEs which have international joint ventures, for example FAW and 
ChangAn, have this dual strategy. They produce foreign models in joint ventures, license 
foreign models to produce in their independent plants, and also further develop the 
licensed models in their fully-owned R&D centres. For the example of FAW, they try to 
obtain know-how through technology spilled over from foreign partners, and also expect 
the learning effects of doing the job by themselves. The “Red Flag” model was developed 
independently, but on the basis of a licensed Audi 100 platform. The latest version of 
“Red Flag” will be based on the Toyota Crown platform30. The independent and historical 
“Liberation” trucks have been locally developed on licensed technologies from European 
companies, such as AVL and Deutz. FAW ambitiously intends to establish its truck 
                                                          
30 From the interview with senior managers at Toyota Technical Center in Tianjin, China, May 11, 2006 
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division as a global commercial vehicle maker, rivalling with Mercedes-Benz and Volvo31. 
3) Self-reliant “Buy-in” 
SAIC is a unique example to buy not only technologies, but also “capabilities”. In 
2003, SAIC took over 48.92% share holdings of Ssangyong Motors, and aims to utilize 
the technology force of Ssangyong to develop Shanghai badge cars. Moreover, it bought 
the Rover 25/75 car models and ten engines for £67 million in 2004 from MG Rover, 
then employed previous Rover engineers and Ricardo of England to help develop 
Shanghai badge models based on Rover product technologies. 
There are also many indigenous manufacturers that still rely entirely on foreign 
designs, and that have no actual move to develop independent technological capabilities. 
Dongfeng and GAIG are of this type. Partly because of the internal financial limit within 
Dongfeng, and the historical lack of automotive production experience in GAIG, the joint 
venture operations are managed by the foreign partners, and the Chinese partners seem to 
only play an assistant role. 
Meanwhile, besides the bottom-up initiative of the companies to develop their 
technological capabilities, the Chinese government also has its top-down strategy that is 
aimed to jump over the current stage of traditional automotive technologies, which 
require a long time for the immature Chinese companies to learn, and aimed to gain a 
early-mover advantage when the automotive industry is revolutionized again. The 
governmental policy makers think, in the domain of the next generation electric and 
hydrogen vehicle technologies, which have the potential to boost the revolution of 
automotive industry, almost all the vehicle models are still prototypes in laboratories. 
Hence China is at the same starting line with other countries, and the Chinese companies 
are not far behind. Developing the next generation vehicles from now on may give China 
the chance to leap frog its automotive industry to the international level when the era of 
electrical or hydrogen vehicles comes. Therefore, the central government has been 
sponsoring, supporting and encouraging the universities, national laboratories and 
automotive companies to develop hybrid vehicles and fuel cell hydrogen vehicles under 
                                                          
31 FOURIN China Auto Weekly, “New Regulation on Operating Rate: Freezing Expansion through 
Government Measure”, July 3, 2006 
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its huge national project “Electrical Vehicles R&D and Commercialization” via the 
administration of the Ministry of Science and Technology. This national-wide project is 
being conducted to develop China’s own new energy vehicle technologies for the next 
generation with an ultimate intention to commercialize these technologies through the 
government-led efforts.  
Some local automakers, such as Chery, FAW, ChangAn and Dongfeng, have been 
dedicated to developing electrical and hybrid vehicles. Especially, ChangAn has 
announced its tentative plan to produce and market its self-designed hybrid vehicles from 
2007. Shanghai municipal government commanded SAIC, SAIC-VW and SAIC-GM to 
produce certain amounts of hybrid vehicles by all means from 2008. At the same time, 
the fuel cell hydrogen research and development are conducted mainly in the national 
labs located at universities, for example Tsinghua University in Beijing for heavy duty 
fuel cell bus and Tongji University in Shanghai for fuel cell cars. And, a demonstration 
and testing hydrogen bus fleet, which is consisted of three Mercedes-Benz Citaro buses 
and three locally-developed ones, has started to operate commercially in the 2008 
Olympic Garden area in Beijing (Luo, 2004). 
2.5 Motorization and Future 
Over the last two decades, with the fast growing Chinese automotive industry is the 
increasing automobile ownership. Figure 2.10 shows the rapid growth of vehicles in use 
in China from 1990 to 2002. In 2004, the registered vehicles on the roads reached 27.42 
million, of which the private owned accounted for 49.8%. The privately-owned motor 
vehicles grew about 22% per year over the past two decades.  
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Figure 2.10: Vehicles in Use in China (1990~2002) 
Source: Winebrake, Rothenberg and Luo (2006) 
The continuing growth of the overall economy and the marketization reform (which 
means less governmental intervention) may guarantee the sustainability of domestic 
vehicle demand growth. On one hand, as people become more affluent in China, the 
desire to own a private vehicle will increase (Gan, 2003). On the other hand, more people 
may buy affordable economic cars which were restricted in China because of the 
government is making efforts to lift the regional restrictions on economic car purchase 
and use. On January 4, 2006, six government agencies 32  jointly released a policy 
“Encouraging the Use of Efficient and Clean Light Weight Cars” requiring all the 
national or regional discriminative restrictions on the use of economic cars should be 
abolished by March 2006. Figure 2.11 indicates the trend of increasing economic car 
consumption, compared with the forecast demand in India, which is dominated primarily 
by private customers. 
                                                          
32 The six agencies include: National Reform and Development Commission, Ministry of Construction, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Supervision, State Environmental Protection 
Administration. 
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Figure 2.11: Price Segments of Motor Vehicle Sales in China (2003~2005) 
Source: Nakamura (2005) 
Based on the current growth rate, the demand for entire automobiles in China is 
expected to climb up to 6.4~6.6 million units in 2006. A far future outlook done by China 
National Development Research Center (NDRC) predicted that, the total demand for 
2020 would vary from 16.9 to 23.6 million units with regard to the GDP growth ranging 
from 6% to 8%, including a demand for cars ranging from 14.51 million to 20.43 million 
(Chen, Liu and Feng, 2004).  
However, it is still far for the Chinese automotive market to be saturated according to 
the growing posture, market size and strength of China’s overall economy. So far, the 
total highway mileage of China has reached the No.2 in the world only after United 
States, but the ratio of vehicles/mileage is only 1/3 of the U.S., 1/5 of Japan, 1/6 of 
Germany and 1/12 of South Korea. Figure 2.10 also has shown the downward trend of 
the number of people per private-owned vehicle in China, which has decreased from 
3,700 people per vehicle in 1985 to 85 people per vehicle in 2003. In comparison, the 
United States has approximately 1.3 people per vehicle so far. If China reaches this 
amount, there would be about 1 billion vehicles operating in China (Winebrake, 
Rothenberg and Luo, 2006). Also, if every 100 people buy one automobile in a year, this 
country's vehicle sales increment will be 13 million. The market potential is huge if the 
growth trend continues. 
Although China’s overall economic growth will undoubtedly continue in the short 
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and medium term according to the current trend as well as the political and societal 
stability, the growth sustainability in the automotive sector is unclear because of many 
determinants, such as auto financing, oil price, taxation as well as other governmental 
interventions. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is an overview of the current characteristics of the Chinese automotive 
industry.  
The industry production and sales have been growing in the past two decades by 
about 15% year on year, and are expected to develop as sustainable as the overall 
economy of China. However, through the past two decades when the government tried to 
leap frog the industry for indigenous capabilities, the industry has been gradually 
structured with fragmentation and a convoluted Chinese-characterized complexity 
composed of various types of manufacturers and stakeholders: the foreign-invested joint 
ventures with the advantage of technology and brand, the large SOEs with the advantage 
of government support, and the “young tigers” with independence and ambition. Foreign 
brands are dominating, especially in the passenger car market, because of the historical 
lack of technological capabilities and brand power of the indigenous enterprises. 
Generally, the fragmentation and diseconomy of scale of the industry, in particular, imply 
the inefficiency under the splendid cover of the market prosperity since 2001. 
In the next chapter, we will systematically analyze how the industry has evolved to 
be the current situation under the interventions from the government through a 
comprehensive set of industrial polices.  
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Chapter 3 Industrial Evolution with Policy Interventions 
 
The complex industrial structure and characteristics were formed through the past 
decades with the interventions from the government through its automotive industry 
policies (Appendix B and C). This comprehensive set of industrial policies is associated 
with issues about international trade, foreign investment, technology transfer, and etc. In 
this chapter, the policies and their dynamic impacts on the evolution of the Chinese 
automotive industry are analyzed systematically.  
3.1 The Policies 
The Chinese policy makers in the 1980s set the automotive industry as one of their 
pillar industries, and expected it to pull the development of this country’s overall 
economy. Unlike Brazil and Mexico, they had no interest in turning China into an 
expansion base of the global automotive giants, and expected to use policy tools to leap 
frog its indigenous automotive firms onto the world level of advanced financial and 
technological strength. However, the difficulty for this ambitious goal is that, both 
technology and capital were scarce in the domestic automotive industry when the whole 
country just started to recover from the turmoil and disaster of the Cultural Revolution. 
Therefore, the government pinned its hope on the technology transfer and spillover from 
the developed countries. Then for the automotive industry, a complex set of industrial 
policies and regulations were implemented with the goal to protect the domestic market 
from foreign competition, to attract FDI at the same time, and to foster the technology 
know-how to diffuse from the international automakers to Chinese enterprises. The 
policies are lengthy but the key issues are introduced below. 
Trade Barriers 
Traditional trade barriers, such as high import tariff, restrictive annual quota and 
importation license, were adopted in order to protect the supported SOEs with a relatively 
easy environment. Trade barrier is commonly used in the developing countries to protect 
their immature industries. The import tariff had been historically high in the range of 200 
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to 300 percent in the 1980s and 100 to 200 percent in the early to mid-1990s (Huang, 
2003).  
Joint Venture Regulation 
The government offered preferential policies, such as cheap land use, tax exemption 
and etc, to lobby for FDI. However, they only allow the international automotive 
manufacturers to make engines and finished cars in joint ventures with the Chinese local 
manufacturers, with no more than 50 percent share holdings. Also, the foreign companies 
can have at most two local partners. The policy makers expected the joint venture format 
could enforce the in-house technology spillover to take place. Affiliated requirements and 
encouragements include setting up R&D divisions within the joint venture, making 
products at the international technology levels, intending to export and giving the 
indigenous suppliers equal privileges for sourcing contracts. 
Local Content Rule 
To complement the joint venture requirement, the international joint ventures are 
required to have a local content rate above 40% in the first year of production, and to 
increase the rate to 60 percent and 80 percent in the 2nd and 3rd years (KPMG, 2004). 
Local content rule is commonly used in the developing countries to restrict imports as a 
non-tariff barrier and stimulate the development of domestic industries. In China, 
however, the pursuit for local content rate was distorted. Some indigenous brands and 
independent plants of the original SOEs were regrouped, and became the component and 
part suppliers to serve the international joint ventures. Some SOEs at that time decided to 
give up indigenous brands and existing independent car making operations that were 
regarded as outdated and hopeless, and to focus on supporting and serving the 
international joint ventures. The policy makers regarded foreign cars produced in China 
with a high content rate of local-produced parts as Chinese indigenous cars. 
Entry Limit 
In order to form the economy of scale from the beginning, the central government 
limited the industry entry, and only gave the franchise of making cars to several 
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supported SOEs, particularly the Chinese "Big Three, Small Three and Min two”33. And 
the international automakers were allowed to manufacturer cars only with those 
authorized SOEs in their joint ventures before 1997. Actually, only Volkswagen, PSA, 
Chrysler and Suzuki gained the right to produce cars before 1997 because the policy 
makers considered that China did not need too many passenger cars and having 
Volkswagen, Citroen and Peugeot in China was already enough. They were worried 
about that too many companies entering the industry would bring overcapacity like that 
in the U.S. automotive industry. Meanwhile, indigenous private investment was 
forbidden in automobile production although allowed in other business like textile, 
television and etc, because the government regarded the automotive industry as a pillar 
industry that most needs its central planning. 
There were also some other specific policies implemented at that time. In the past 
two decades, these industrial policies were generally in favor of the SOEs, and generated 
complex outcomes, of which some are positive and the others are negative. The SOEs 
that had international joint ventures from the beginning have been cash-rich and gained 
know-how spilled over from their joint venture partners to some extent. However, the 
overall industry is still inefficient and far below the international competitiveness level, 
industrial-wide economy of scale failed to be formed, and indigenous technological 
capabilities were insufficient to support independent growth. 
3.2 Establishment of Industrial Fragmentation 
3.2.1 Fragmentation by Departmentalism and Regionalism 
In Chapter 2, we have seen the Chinese automotive industry is highly fragmented in 
terms of the number of manufactures, geographical distribution and the ownership of 
manufacturers. This fragmentation leads to inefficiency of the scale-sensitive automotive 
production. 
The number of manufacturers grew with a linkage to the historical stages the new 
                                                          
33 The ‘Big Three’ were First Automotive Works, Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation and 
Dongfeng Motor Company, the ‘Small Three’ were Beijing Automotive Industrial Corporation, Tianjin 
Automotive Industrial Corporation and Guangzhou Automotive Industrial Corporation, and the ‘Mini Two’ 
were Changan and Guizhou Aviation (Xia, 2002). 
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China has experienced since 1949. In this study, we summary there have been three major 
waves of automotive manufacturing establishments as illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
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Figure 3.1: Accumulation of Automotive Manufacturers over Time 
Source: Original data are from China Automotive Industry Yearbooks; analyzed by the 
author 
The first wave was in the period of China’s first five-year plan. In the 1950s, First 
Automobile Works was established by the central government. At the same time, a few 
regional automotive plants, such as Shanghai Automobile Works (later SAIC) and Beijing 
Automobile Works (later BAIC), were constructed by the municipal or provincial 
governments.  
The second wave of state-owned motor vehicle plant establishments came for the 
increased military demand during the period of Cold War and military conflicts with 
India on the west border, the Soviet Union on the north border and with United States in 
Vietnam. The Second Automobile Works (Dongfeng), Sichuan Automobile Works, 
Shanxi Automobile Works and so on were established in the 1960s mainly to produce 
military trucks, and were located in mountain areas of central China for security purpose.  
The third wave came in the mid-1980s with the economic reform. The government 
officially set the automotive industry as one of the pillar industries in 1986, and 
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implemented a few policies to protect this industry and foster its development. Many 
military plants that produced weapons, as well as the plants that belong to the aerospace 
and aeronautic administrations, were transformed to produce automobiles during this 
period of time in order to survive after the Cold War without as many military contracts 
as before in that peaceful era. With their diversified origins, a large number of automotive 
plants established during this period of time were controlled by many different 
government ministries. In the late 1980s, the international joint venture, including Beijing 
Jeep (with Chrysler), Dongfeng Citroen, Tianjin Daihatsu, Guangzhou Peugeot and etc 
were also established.  
From the late 1980s, the entry to this industry was limited in order to foster 
economies of scale. The government prohibited passenger car projects other than in the 
supported SOEs which included the so-called “Big Three, Small Three & Mini Two”. 
However, actually a large base of state-owned automotive assembly enterprises, as well 
as several joint ventures between the selected SOEs and international automakers, has 
been established since the 1950s. By the end of 1990s, the central government loosened 
the industrial entry limit in line with China’s obligations to WTO. Thus more 
international automakers and especially, another major type of manufacturers - 
indigenous private firms, entered this industry to capture the fast growing demand for 
automobiles in China.  
Furthermore, these automotive enterprises are also fragmented in terms of regionality 
as introduced in Chapter 2. Table 2.2 has shown only three provinces (Tibet, Qinhai and 
Ningxia) in China had no automotive production in 2004. Compared with the United 
States having Detroit, China does not have such a relatively dominant automotive capital, 
but a few automotive cities. The major clusters are around the key regional industrial 
centers – Changchun, Shanghai, Beijing, Hubei, Chongqing and Guangzhou. Although 
we see six distinct clusters, in fact automotive production facilities spread out at every 
corner of this country, as shown in Figure 3.2. The dark dots stand for the international 
joint ventures, and the grey for indigenous automakers. The numbers in the boxes are the 
vehicle production volumes in the related regions in 2004. 
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Figure 3.2: Clusters of Vehicle Manufacturers in China 
Source: Map is from Aautomotive News 2006 Guide to China’s Auto Market, and Clusters 
are summarized by the author 
The diversified ownership is the major reason associated with the large number of 
manufacturers and the fragmentation by regionality. The Changchun region was chosen 
for FAW (First Automobile Works) by the central government in the 1950s because it is 
geographically close to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Shanghai’s automotive 
industry was the effort of its municipal government based on the local manufacturing 
base. Beijing, as the country’s capital, used to enjoy being favored by policies. Early in 
1983, it is just in Beijing where China’s first international joint venture - Beijing Jeep Co., 
was established with American Motors Company and BAIC, very soon after the country 
started its economic reform. Today, Beijing is the largest regional personal car market in 
China. Mercedes Benz’s new joint venture has been building C- and E-Class sedans in 
Beijing to feed the demand of governmental officials in China’s capital. The Hubei 
Province is listed as one of the centers because of Dongfeng (also called Second 
Automobile Works), which was established among the mountains in Hubei during the 
Cold War era as a backup of FAW for security and military reasons. The various small 
automotive enterprises in Chongqing were mainly transformed from the military plants 
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belonging to the previous Ministry of Weapon Industry, which were also located far 
inside the Chinese territory for military security during the Cold War era. To survive in an 
era without wars, many such military plants have to transform to produce civil products, 
such as automobiles, motor cycles, engineering machinery as well as household 
electronics. In Guangzhou, the local government aimed to develop automotive industry 
after the economic reform began. After Peugeot’s unsuccessful venture (1985~1997) as 
an initial try, the arrivals of Japanese carmakers - Honda, Toyota and Nissan put 
Guangzhou to the forefront of China’s automotive industry. Hyundai is also constructing 
a joint venture with GAIG for commercial vehicles near Guangzhou. 
As the history tells us, all these facilities spread over the country’s territory belong to 
different governmental bureaus or administrations. In another word, the fragmentation is 
not only materialized by regionality and the huge number of manufacturers, but also the 
political involvement in the ownership of enterprises. The ownerships of major 
indigenous automotive groups in China are listed in Table 3.1. As a matter of fact, the 
political ownership to some extent determined the geographical distribution of 
automotive production facilities in China. 
Table 3.1: Ownerships of Chinese Indigenous Automotive Industry Groups 
Indigenous Automotive Groups Ownership 
First Automotive Works   Central Government 
Dongfeng Motor Corporation   Central Government 
ChangAn Automotive Corporation   China Weapon and Arming Group   (Central Government) 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp.   Shanghai Municipal Government 
Beijing Automotive Industry Corp.   Beijing Municipal Government 
Guangzhou Automotive Industry Group   Guangzhou Municipal Government 
Hafei Motor Co. Ltd   China Second Group of Aeronautic Industry          (Central Government) 
Chery Automobile Co. Ltd   Wuhu Municipal Government 
Great Wall Motor Co. Ltd   Private 
Geely Holding Corporation   Private 
Lifan Industry Corporation   Private 
Source: Company websites and various sources 
The reasons for the fragmentation are raveled together mainly by the governmental 
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mechanism that affected the ownership structure and corporate activities in China. 
First, the industrial protectionism regulations and polices made inefficient enterprises 
highly survivable and profitable. In the 1980s, in order to foster and protect its immature 
indigenous automotive industry, the government implemented very high tariff rates and 
restrictive import quota among all the comparable developing countries. And the 
permission of automotive production also needed to be authorized by the central 
government, facially to pursue a scale economy. With the high price margin, the 
automakers in China could break even by only producing about 10,000 units, compared 
with the commonly recognized standard of 250,000 units for assembling a single model 
type (Huang, 2003). All these governmental policies in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in 
an inefficient but rather profitable automotive industry. Thus, almost all the industrial 
administrations (for example, the Ministry of Weapon Industry, the Ministry of 
Aeronautic and Aerospace Industry, the Ministry of Machinery Industry and etc.) and 
municipal or regional governments tried to produce cars within their affiliated enterprises 
during the 1980s to 1990s. Especially, many of the military plants, which lost contacts 
after the Cold War era, tried to turn their manufacturing operations, which are located in 
different regions all over the country, into automotive production plants. The State 
Planning Committee (SPC), the nation's economic regulator which has been renamed to 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), on behalf of the central 
government, was dedicated to regulating automotive production in the big automotive 
groups for economy of scale from the beginning. However, these government agencies 
and local governments have relatively equivalent and independent political power and 
influence with SPC. The power of SPC was limited, and the actual effects of the 
automotive policies were distorted.  
To summarize, the large base of manufacturers were established and owned by 
different governmental administrations before the central planning system began to 
manage and adjust the automotive industry purposely. The profitable automotive business 
attracted a big number of state-owned entrants from the 1980s, and most of them still 
inefficiently remain in the business with the profits made due to the market protection. 
This is the reason for the large number of manufacturers. Because the manufacturing 
enterprises for other use owned by different central government agencies and different 
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regional governments were originally dispersed, the automotive industry was inevitably 
scattered geographically when these plants turned into automotive operations. This is the 
reason for the fragmentation by regionality. Although the government tried to foster the 
economy of scale to be formed, the measures were taken later than the large base of 
manufacturers had been established. Furthermore, the central power was not strong 
enough to guarantee the policies to work at the local governments. Therefore, the 
fragmentations still remain because of the regionalism of regional governments and the 
departmentalism of the governmental administrations that have decentralized and 
equivalent political power. The causal relationships are summarized in Figure 3.3 below. 
Diseconomy of Scale
Fragmentation by
Manufacturer
   Fragmentation by
Regionality
Departmentalism of Central Governmental Administrations &
Regionalism of Local Governments
   Fragmentation by
Ownership
 
Figure 3.3: Reasons for Diseconomy of Scale 
Based on the current ownership structure involved with fragmented but strong 
political power of various ambitious local governments and central government ministries, 
large-scale regrouping (merger and acquisition) is still difficult to take place across 
different political administrations. In the past six years, the observed merger or 
acquisitions were very few, including only FAW acquiring Tianjin Automotive Industry 
Corporation, SAIC acquiring Liuzhou Wulin Motors with GM, and Changan controlling 
Jiangling Motors with Ford. Assuming the current political regulation system unchanging, 
it would take longer time for China to consolidate its automotive industry to the level of 
the U.S than the time for the U.S. automotive industry, although deepening consolidation 
is predictable along with the general industrial maturation process. 
3.2.2 Case of Development under Regionalism -- Chery Automobile Company 
As analyzed above, part of the reasons for the fragmentation is that, the regional 
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governments sought to develop their own local automotive production to drive the local 
economic development because of the profits that could be easily made in the protected 
domestic automobile market. Chery is a typical case of development under regionalism. 
Since 2005, Chery Automobile Company, the largest fully impendent Chinese 
automaker, has become world-famous for its self-reliant development strategies and the 
ambition to export cars to the U.S. market. Starting with producing and selling imitated 
cars from 2001, Chery has been dedicated to exportation, and has exported to more than 
30 countries since then. It also assembles cars in Iran and Russia. From 2005, Chery 
started to work with Visionary Vehicles in the United States on the well-known venture to 
export cars the United States. Chery’s domestic sales soared 118.5% to 189,158 units 
from 2004 to 2005, since its announcement on the U.S. exportation venture. This 6 years 
old company has moved up to top three among the domestic passenger car companies in 
the first four months of 2006.  
However, none would easily believe the fact that it was illegal when Chery was 
initially constructed by Wuhu34 local government in 1997. The Wuhu city government 
decided to develop the local economy with a lead from the automotive production in the 
early 1990s. They bought an assembly line of Ford in UK in 1996, but their automotive 
production project was overruled by the central government which implemented strict 
industry entry limits in the 1990s. So the Wuhu city government initially set up the so-
called Anhui Automotive Part Industrial Company (AAPIC), and secretly started to 
manufacture cars since 1999. In 1999, the first batch of cars was sold to the local taxi 
companies in Wuhu city with the coordination of the local government. Afterwards, in 
2000, the central government found AAPIC’s unauthorized car production, and 
commanded it to shut down. In order to survive, AAPIC joined SAIC with a cost of 
demising 20% of its registered asset (US$42 million) to SAIC. Then the company began 
to use the name “SAIC-Chery Automobile Company” as a subsidiary of SAIC. The fact 
was that, Chery kept its organizational independence except the name, based on the 
mutual agreement between SAIC and Chery. Afterwards, Chery itself obtained the 
permission for producing cars in 2003, and later SAIC shed its share holdings of Chery 
                                                          
34 Wuhu is a small city in Anhui province, a relatively poor agricultural province to the west of Shanghai. 
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because of the intellectual property disputes between Chery and General Motors -- 
SAIC’s most important joint venture partner (Luo, 2005a). 
Since the beginning, Chery has been an operation of the Wuhu local government for 
the purpose for its local industrialization. Although the project was forbidden by the 
central government, it had the surreptitious support from the local and even the Anhui 
provincial governments. In fact, Xialai Zhan, the Wuhu assistant mayor in 1997 and the 
mayor afterwards, stayed as the president of AAPIC and subsequent Chery from 1997 to 
2004, even though government officers are not allowed to take business responsibilities 
in China. Xialai Zhan was famous as “Red Hat Business Man”, and was forced to step 
down in year 2004. So far, because of the successful operations from 2001 to 2005, the 
central government has turned around its attitude and been supporting Chery with 
preferential loans and governmental contacts. So far, Chery is still one hundred percent 
owned by the Wuhu local government.  
Obviously, the regionalism of the Wuhu local government gave the birth of Chery. In 
China’s governmental system, many regional governments operate rather independently 
to seek ways for local interests. Industrial polices sometimes may not be actually carried 
out at the city or even provincial levels. There are also many other similar small regional 
automotive production enterprises owned by different levels of governments and 
ministries for their interests, and most of them operate inefficiently but could make 
profits to remain in the business. For those who make little profit, their government 
owners may also support them to survive with capital and resource indraught. 
Nevertheless, Chery is a rare successful case of regionalism. 
3.2.3 Case of Multifaceted Strategies of SOEs -- ChangAn Automobile Co. 
ChangAn Automotive Corporation poses an epitome of the complex and changing 
development strategies of China’s large state-owned automotive companies under a 
changing political and economic environment. 
ChangAn, based in Chongqing -- the industrial center of western China, sold 631,142 
motor vehicles in 2005 as the fourth largest indigenous automaker. So far, ChangAn has 
two joint ventures with Ford and Suzuki as well as a few independent subsidiaries in the 
north, east and south of China. ChangAn’s history traces back to a machine gun factory 
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established in the Dynasty Qing. It continued to produce machine guns under the 
Ministry of Weapon Industry after the new China was established in 1949. Similar with 
other military factories located in the inner China that sought to survive in the peaceful 
era of “Economic Reform and Open”, ChangAn started its automotive production with 
the licensed Suzuki mini vans and cars from 1984. Since then ChangAn has been the 
market leader in the mini vehicle segment. When international automakers were entering 
China, ChangAn was selected as one of the “Mini Two” to establish international joint 
ventures. The first joint venture was created with Suzuki in 1993 to continue ChangAn’s 
strength in the mini car segment. ChangAn established the joint venture with Ford in 
2001 which promises to become increasingly important to both. Besides the collaboration 
with joint venture partners, ChangAn also has posed an ambitious independent expansion 
strategy. By acquiring Hebei ChangAn, Nanjing ChangAn and Jiangling Motors after 
2000 across the territory of China, ChangAn has become the fourth largest indigenous 
automaker in China. Different from other big SOEs which rely on the international joint 
ventures, 2/3 of ChangAn’s sales in 2005 came from its independent subsidiary plants. 
ChangAn has been expanding a huge independent R&D center and multi independent 
subsidiary plants, which produce ChangAn brand cars, trucks and buses. 
Compared with Chery’s short history and simple ownership and strategy, ChangAn’s 
corporate structure and strategies are comprehensive, multifaceted, and evolving with the 
changes of the political and economic environment in China. As a military enterprise 
originally owned by the former Ministry of Weapon Industry, ChangAn transformed to 
make cars for civil use in the 1980s. Afterwards, it was selected to be protected and to 
build international joint ventures perhaps because of its consanguinity with the central 
government. At the same time of cooperating with the international automakers, 
ChangAn has also developed its independent capabilities by the turn of the last century. 
This is why ChangAn has multi types of subsidiaries, and dual strategies -- learning from 
the global automakers through the joint ventures as well as learning by doing in its 
independent strategies, although the efforts were very limited.  
Generally speaking, along with the evolution of the eras, ChangAn has built up a 
comprehensive set of operations, as well as a complex set of strategies. The complexity 
of ChangAn’s corporate structure and strategy just reflects the complexity and changing 
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fact of the economic and political environment in the automotive industry in China.  
3.3 FDI, Technology Spillover and Limitations 
The comprehensive policies embody some basic intensions that materialize the leap-
frog and catch-up ambition of the policy makers, including: 
1) Protect the immature indigenous firms by trade barriers, e.g. tariff and quota. 
2) Create “economy of scale” from the beginning by allocating resources only to 
favored state-owned companies and their joint ventures. 
3) Take advantage of the spillover effects in international joint ventures to develop 
indigenous management techniques and technological capabilities. 
The policies’ “protection” part is similar with other developing countries, but the 
“development” part is quite unique. To regulate FDI in only the format of joint ventures 
is a policy instrument innovation of the Chinese government. And the local content rule, 
as an additive, also aimed to reinforce the spillover effects from the foreign side to the 
local suppliers. The basic motivation is that, in order to develop and even catch up, the 
immature indigenous firms need not only protection, but also assistance from outside, 
according to the reality of lacking the necessary industrialization experience.  
In China, this strategy is well-known as “Bargaining Market for Technology”. It 
means, the government uses China’s huge market potential to attract FDI, but what they 
want is the technology know-how from the international automakers. Similar strategy 
was also used for some other industries to develop without historical industrialization 
base.  
The intended functioning routines of these policies are systematically summarized in 
Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4: Intended Routines of the Government Policies 
However, the later actual development routines were distorted away from this road 
map. The system dynamics casual routines in Figure 3.5 show how the governmental 
policies failed to cultivate technological capabilities of the indigenous state-owned firms 
by their purposely-designed industrial policies. 
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Figure 3.5: Actual Routines for Failure of the Government Policies 
3.3.1 The Policies Created Oligopoly 
The trade barriers, entry limit and joint venture regulation as well as the follow-up 
measures for the local content rate pursuit worked together and generated the oligopoly 
of the stated-owned enterprises.  
The entry limit regulated many private investors out of the automotive production 
business. Also, many automotive groups that created international joint ventures 
gradually gave up their existing brands and merged their independent plants into the joint 
ventures to supply parts, in order to solely pursue local content rate of joint ventures. For 
example, SAIC had its independent sedan brand “Shanghai” before establishing the joint 
venture with Volkswagen, but its leaders gave up the independent brand, and regrouped 
all the former existing passenger car and truck divisions into the joint venture as internal 
component and part suppliers. They regarded the cars with high local content rate as 
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Chinese indigenous cars, and strictly required the local content rate of the cars produced 
in the joint venture. Then, the former famous Chinese sedan brand “Shanghai” was given 
up and then disappeared. Meanwhile, the local content rate of Santana sedan (Passat B2) 
of Shanghai-Volkswagen was forced to increase from 2.7% in 1987 to 90% in 1997. The 
policy makers regarded Santana as a successful indigenous Chinese car since it has a high 
local content rate. Therefore, the pursuit for local content rate also indirectly contributed 
to the oligopoly of the international joint ventures.  
Especially in the passenger car market, the market power was gradually controlled by 
the international joint ventures, especially Shanghai Volkswagen, FAW-Volkswagen and 
Dongfeng-Citroen in the 1980s and 1990s, because of the products they have in hand. 
Given the market power from the oligopoly, both the local partners (e.g. FAW, SAIC 
and Dongfeng) and their international joint venture partners (e.g. Volkswagen and Citroen) 
made huge profits by collusively fixing the high price for cars sold in China. Shanghai-
Volkswagen earned net profits US$723 million by selling only 230,000 Santana sedans 
(Passat B2, an outdated model) in 1998 and 199935. Also, a Goldman Sachs study 
indicated that 80% of Volkswagen’s global earnings amazingly came from China in the 
first half of year 200336. Those numbers indicated the rather big price margins of the car 
products, and huge profits the joint ventures made within the protected uncompetitive 
environment of the Chinese automotive market from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.  
3.3.2 Oligopoly Held Back R&D Activities within International Joint Ventures 
In nature, oligopoly hinders technology innovations. The same in the Chinese 
automotive industry, the foreign partners of the joint ventures collusively adopted the 
strategy of postponing the update of the product line and keeping selling outdated models 
even in a fast growing market. In 1999, in the Chinese car market there were only about 
10 foreign brands and 20 outdated models that were 5~10 years older than those in the 
developed countries’ markets (Lu, 2005). As the outdated models kept selling well at 
remarkably high prices in the protected uncompetitive Chinese automotive market, 
extending the life cycle of existing products fit with the business interest of all the 
                                                          
35 21th Century Economics Report, December 27, 2003 
36 New Beijing Daily, January 15, 2004 
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companies.  
Also, this complex cross-holding partnership structure, as shown in Figure 2.6 
resulted in the exposure of product technologies and manufacturing techniques to even 
competitors of each other, who share the same venture partners in China (Tierney, 2003). 
For example, Nissan, PSA, Honda and Kia have joint ventures with Dongfeng, 
Volkswagen, Toyota and Mazda build cars with FAW, while Volkswagen and General 
Motors share the same partner SAIC. Given this odd network of partnerships, it is hard to 
protect intellectual property right in this industry. Therefore, the international automakers 
always hesitate to bring in their advanced technologies to the joint ventures in China. 
Furthermore, in nature, the foreign firms would never really help local Chinese firms 
understand their key product technologies, because the local firms also could become 
their potential competitors in the future. Conversely, in fact international automakers 
tended to hide their advanced technologies as business secret in the joint venture 
operations. Obviously, they had no interest doing advanced research and development in 
China. In an interview of IMVP researchers in May 2006 at the Pan Asia Technical 
Automotive Center (PATAC) in Shanghai, the joint venture R&D center of GM and 
SAIC, a senior GM executive mentioned they have a “firewall” policy in this joint 
venture R&D center to prevent the engineers of Chinese citizenship from touching some 
protected information and devices. 
The oligopoly market environment and the cross-holding joint venture structure 
reduced the international automakers’ naturally limited incentive to conduct R&D 
activities in the joint ventures located in China.  
On the other hand, the Chinese managers in the joint ventures could not prevent this 
situation from happening. They had no bargaining and managerial power in the decision 
making process on product technologies and production management because they had 
few self-owned brands and little basic know-how about product technology and 
manufacturing management. 
Therefore, product development activities in the joint ventures were limited in the 
past two decades. The local engineers in joint ventures learned some basics, but had few 
chances to join in advanced product development activities. 
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3.3.3 Oligopoly Weakened Incentives for Independent R&D of SOEs 
In the mean time when the product technological know-how was not transferred 
actively by the international automakers, the indigenous state-owned automotive 
enterprises, mostly the “Big Three and Small Three”, also dramatically lost the 
motivation to conduct their independent product R&D and production activities. 
Because the government only allowed the foreign automakers to make cars with its 
SOEs, the international automakers competed intensely for a good local partner that 
could guarantee a share in this protected profitable market. Also because the local private 
investors were regulated out of this game, with their franchise obtained from the 
government, the only important thing the Chinese SOEs needed to do for guaranteeing 
good profits was to pick up a good foreign partner. Afterwards, by sharing the profits of 
the international joint ventures that dominated the market, the SOEs earned a lot of 
money easily without making any significant cooperative or independent efforts. For 
example, SAIC gained a net profit about US$689 million in 2003 according to Fortune 
2004, better than many international automotive giants, such as Ford and 
DaimlerChrysler in that year37. It had no independent brands and assembly plants other 
than two joint ventures with Volkswagen and General Motors, but it was amazingly listed 
as one of the “Fortune Global 500 Largest Companies” in 2003 and 2005. SAIC became 
rich only because it had the right to make cars in China, and shared it with Volkswagen 
and General Motors, the 2 strongest international players in China.  
With the protection of the government, it was so easy for the SOEs to make money to 
the extent that they actually refused to take risk to invest on independent product research 
and development that could be barren. Gradually, these indigenous SOEs lost the 
motivation of conducting independent original product development activities, and even 
some of them began to focus on capital operations, such as SAIC. Then, they went deep 
to rely on the indraught of foreign car models to manufacture.  
This situation conversely reinforced the lack of technological capabilities of these 
                                                          
37 The net profits of major global automakers in 2003:  Toyota: $8,923 million; Hyundai: $1,400 million; 
GM: $3,822 million; DaimlerChrysler: $564 million; Ford: $495 million; GM China: $437 million. (from 
the financial reports on company websites) 
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Chinese enterprises as well as their reliance on the international joint venture partners, 
and fixed them in an adjunctive position within the joint ventures. Thus the joint ventures 
were actually used as international automakers’ production bases for the Chinese local 
market. 
3.3.4 Positive Effects of International Joint Ventures 
Although the policies failed to completely establish independent technological 
capabilities of the indigenous SOEs, and lost the control of the Chinese passenger car 
market to the international automakers, they also had positive roles matching with the 
original policy goals.  
First of all, the governmental policies did transfer the manufacturing techniques to 
the locals via joint ventures to some degree. Many Chinese local experts, engineers and 
work force gained experience and understanding in the joint venture plants.  Afterwards, 
many of these experienced managers and engineers transferred to the later-established 
self-reliant indigenous automotive firms, such as Chery and Geely, and helped their initial 
start-up. For instance, Chery president Mr. Tongyao Yin was the manager in the FAW-
Volkswagen Jetta plant before he moved to Wuhu, and Geely vice president Mr. Yang 
Nan was the CEO of Shanghai-Volkswagen  (Lu, 2005). 
Second, the local automotive part industry was developed under the policy forcing 
the localization of foreign-introduced models. The local suppliers obtained experience 
from dealing with foreign firms to improve technology, quality and management to meet 
their requirements of the international joint ventures. Also, the ability of the local 
suppliers to supply cheap and qualified components and parts is one of the important 
factors which make it possible for the immature Chinese young tigers to compete with the 
international joint ventures by making cheap budget cars in the recent years.  
Third, the policies protected the indigenous SOEs and fostered their financial 
strength. One example is again SAIC as a “Fortune Global 500 Largest” company. In that 
protected era and environment, the SOEs accumulated enough capitals and assets which 
would help their future expansion plans. Without the protection, SAIC would not have 
the financial capability to acquire the 48.92% share of Ssangyong Motors, 10% of 
Daewoo in 2003, and the entire car and engine intellectual property of MG Rover. 
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Through the past 20 years of development characterized mainly by the trade 
protection and the joint venture regulation, the indigenous automotive firms have become 
rich, but their technological capability is still underdeveloped, and the passenger car 
market has been occupied by foreign brands. The SOEs are continually dependent on the 
indraught of products and technologies from their international partners, while a few 
emerging independent firms, e.g. Chery and Geely, are struggling to cultivate their own 
product development capabilities through a way from reverse engineering to R&D 
outsourcing and self-reliant product development. Generally speaking, the reliance on 
international joint ventures resulted in the industry-wide lack of technological capabilities. 
3.4 Infant Industry Theory and Missing of “Learning By Doing” 
3.4.1 Key Element Behind Protection -- Efficiency Improvement 
As is known to all, simple trade protections on immature industry generates societal 
dead weight loss, especially the consumers would suffer, even though protected firms and 
the government may gain benefits. However, the infant industry theory is not simply 
about protectionism that is against free trade. It is actually a complement of the “free 
trade” doctrines. In particular, the key element of the infant industry argument is the 
presence of positive learning effects that improve productive efficiency during the 
protected period of time. However, in the forgoing sections, we have seen the protection 
of the governmental policies hindered the learning activities in China’s domestic 
automotive industry in the past two decades. Therefore, the policies failed to fulfill the 
key issues of the infant industry theory.  
A microeconomics analysis is given below to demonstrate the key role of learning 
effects for a successful application of the infant industry theory. Similar analyses on the 
effects of tariffs and quotas can be found in microeconomics text books (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 2001; Suranovic, 1997). 
The supply and demand curves for a product in a certain country are shown in Figure 
3.6 below. Assuming there is no trade barrier between the domestic and international 
markets, the free trade price in the world market is Pw, and the consumers in this country 
will consume Dw at price Pw. In this graph, Pw is lower than the intersection of the supply 
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curve with the price axle. It indicates the domestic producers are unable to produce this 
product as cheaply as those firms in other developed countries. So, no domestic 
production would exist in front of the international low price and competition, and the 
product will be imported at a full quantity Dw that the consumers need. In this case, the 
domestic industry is a relatively infant one which could not exist if there is no 
government measure to protect and stimulate its initial growth. 
 
Figure 3.6: Welfare Effect of Tariff on Supply-Demand Curves 
When an import tariff, which equals P*-Pw, is imposed in order to protect the infant 
industry, this protection raises the domestic price to P*. The increase of domestic price 
will stimulate the domestic production from nothing to the level of DD, and decrease the 
domestic demand to D*w. Then, the import would fall from Dw to D*w-DD. 
The static welfare effect of the import tariff is shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Welfare Effects of Tariff 
Consumer Surplus -  A -  B -  C -  D 
Producer Surplus + A 
Government. Revenue + C 
Net National Welfare -  B -  D 
In this situation, consumer surplus is negative. It indicates that consumers are harmed 
due to the high price, which is induced by the tariff and protection. However, the infant 
domestic producers may gain a chance to operate because of the protection. In particular, 
employment is created domestically in an industry that did not even exist before the tariff 
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was imposed. However, even though producers and the government earn revenues, the 
net national welfare under the import tariff is negative. The deadweight loss was because 
the suffering of consumers outweighs the gains of producers and the government. This 
demonstration shows the negative effects of a pure tariff protection. 
Then, we suppose, the domestic industry improves its own production efficiency 
during the temporary import tariff protection. When the cost is reduced so that the 
domestic price decreases to the international price, the domestic producers no long need 
the protection, and then the tariff is removed38. In Figure 3.7, the efficiency improvement 
is represented as a downward shift of the supply curve from Supply to Supply'. In this 
situation, the domestic price equals the world price Pw. The consumer demand would 
return to the original amount Dw, but the domestic industry has been able to serve a 
portion DD of the total demand, in comparison with the original situation when all the 
consumer demand was served by imports. 
 
Figure 3.7: Effect of Efficiency Improvement on Supply-Demand Curves 
The effects of the efficiency improvement and tariff removal are calculated relative 
to the original equilibrium before the tariff was implemented, and the results are listed in 
Table 3.3. When reaching this ideal stage, the consumers and government have no loss or 
gain. However, domestic producers gain a positive surplus +E, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, 
because they have improved to be able to produce at a cost lower than the free trade price. 
                                                          
38  Suranovic (1997) gave the same assumption that the domestic price decreases right to the international 
price, in order to simplify the analytical case. 
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Therefore, the domestic industry makes an overall gain of +E, the same as the producer 
surplus.  
Table 3.3: Welfare Effects of Efficiency Improvement and Tariff Removal 
Consumer Surplus 0 
Producer Surplus + E 
Government. Revenue 0 
Net National Welfare + E 
With a limited period of tariff protection and the efficiency improvement, the 
domestic industry grows from non-existence to be able to survive in front of the 
international competition. Other trade policy measures like quota have similar effects. 
This example shows that, the protection of an infant industry is harmful in a short run, 
but if the protection may stimulate domestic production and efficiency improvements, 
then the long run overall effects may outweigh the short-run loss. Therefore, the key 
element that determines the success of the application of infant industry theory to develop 
an industry is whether the efficiency improvement could be stimulated during the 
protection. 
3.4.2 Missing of “Learning By Doing” 
Back from the simplified analytical case to the complex reality in the Chinese 
automotive industry. The government designed the development policies based on the 
infant industry theory. However, the protection function was emphasized while the 
protected domestic firms’ learning activities were limited. Therefore, the SOEs still 
cannot compete with the international competitors after a protection of 20 years.   
By investigating the top three rows of the flow diagram in Figure 3.5, it is found that 
the technological capabilities and brands of SOEs are affected by two parts of factors. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.8, the part on the left composes a reinforcing loop, and is controlled 
by the motivation of the international partners of the joint ventures. This formed a 
basically unchangeable situation because the international partners of the joint ventures in 
nature have no motivation to foster the technological spillover to their local partners that 
could become competitors in the future. So, only if the “learning by doing” effect is 
fostered, the current stagnant situation of SOE’s limited capability could be changed. As a 
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matter of fact, the successful catch-up stories of the automotive industries in Japan and 
South Korea have shown the power of “learning by doing”. However, in the Chinese 
automotive industry, the catch-up policies were focused on fostering technology spillover, 
while they addressed very little for fostering “learning by doing”.  
 
Figure 3.8: Reinforcing Loop Limiting Technological Spillover Effect  
Both technology spillover and “learning by doing” have positive effects on capability 
development in the immature industries that aim to catch up. The technology spillover 
takes place naturally via foreign invested operations because the foreigners need to train 
the locals about how to use specific machineries, how to solve problems in the 
manufacturing process, how to improve quality, and etc. These kinds of trainings are 
necessary, and technology spillover is inevitable in this process.  
Technology spillover is straight forward and theoretically efficient for latecomers to 
learn, however it has a nature limit and cannot achieve complete technological capability 
and know-how of the learners. First, the investors from the developed countries have the 
nature to hide the core of their advanced technologies to keep their competitive advantage. 
Second, even if the advanced investors would teach, spillover is still not enough for 
completely forming independent capabilities due to the nature of “tacitness of 
technology” (Amsden, 2001). “Tacitness of technology means that technology or 
technological knowledge, which has complex systematic contents, are not codifiable and 
cannot be documented transparently”. Automotive engineering is obviously a complex 
tacit capability.  
In order to fully understand a product technology and master the way to develop and 
produce it, a process of “learning by doing“ is necessarily needed to complement the 
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limitation of technology transfer or spillover. The successful stories of Japan (Wang, 
2001) and South Korea are good evidences (Steers, 1999). Compared with technology 
spillover, “learning by doing” is complicated and time-consuming, but it is also a must 
for accomplishing the development of independent capabilities, such as the capability to 
develop new generation product like T-Model of Ford, or innovative management 
approach like “Toyota Production System”. Such truly independent and original 
capabilities can only be fully created with indigenous innovative characteristics in the 
process of “DOING”. 
The degree of applying technology spillover or learning by doing or both depends on 
how much the initial experience the developing countries already have in the infant 
industry. For instance, after the World War II, Japanese started its automotive industry 
independently through a sole way of learning by doing directly. They initially knocked 
down American cars, studied them and designed cars by imitation, and gradually formed 
independent capabilities to develop and manufacture cars successfully by their own 
approaches. Japanese did not acquire much through technology transfer. But on the other 
side, in South Korea the industrialization experience was weak after the World War II and 
the Korea War. The automotive industry in South Korea started to develop in the late 
1960s with the form of joint ventures with foreign automakers. After accumulating know-
how in the cooperation process, afterwards the Korean gave up this way, and began 
“learning by doing”. For a less developed country with little industrialization experience, 
a development strategy combining the promotions for both technology transfer and 
learning by doing would be appropriate. Both Japan and South Korea were latecomers in 
the take-off periods of their automotive industries, and have successfully developed their 
own technological capabilities. But they chose different ways to go based on the different 
industrialization experience they had when they started to develop. In their stories of 
success, the similarity is both of them necessarily have a procedure of “learning by 
doing”. 
China’s initial industrialization experience was poor and similar with South Korea’s 
at the beginning of their economic growth. In China’s automotive industry, the 
governmental policies did foster technology spillover in the joint ventures. Many experts, 
engineers and work force have been trained and experienced with the techniques needed 
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to accomplish their jobs in the joint venture manufacturing plants. However, till now the 
Chinese indigenous automakers still have no independent product development 
capabilities like what Toyota and Hyundai have achieved, because the industrial policies 
also cumbered the introduction of advanced products, and counteracted the motivation of 
“leaning by doing”. 
3.5 Institutional Failure of “Regulatory Capture” 
From the analysis above, we have understood that the lack of learning effects is 
mainly because of the lack of motivation of SOEs for “learning by doing” activities. Why 
didn’t “learn by doing” happen? By tracing downwards in the flow diagram in Figure 3.5, 
it is found that all the nodes and routines converge at the “oligopoly of the joint ventures”. 
The oligopoly was formed as an integrated effect of the comprehensive set of industrial 
policies. We will further analyze the deeper institutional reasons for the oligopoly than 
the policies on the surface.  
Obviously, all the government polices were in favor of the SOEs, especially the 
Chinese “Three Big and Three Small”. The government in nature used regulations to 
limit any competition toward the SOEs 39 . The indigenous private investment was 
forbidden from the automotive industry until 1997, so the internal competition was 
avoided. Meanwhile, the outer international competition was limited by the high trade 
barriers. And foreign firms were also forced to share their earning and knowledge with 
the SOEs by the policies and regulations. Therefore, as a matter of fact, whom the 
government truly protected were only the SOEs, instead of the entire indigenous industry. 
What the government policies were designed for were not the public benefits, but the 
benefits of the SOEs. In section 2.2.2, we have concluded the advantage of SOEs to 
allocate capital and resources by their political power. This also accords with the 
conclusions that Professor Yasheng Huang analyzed and proved in his book “Selling 
China” (Huang, 2003). “China’s limited economic resources are largely allocated to the 
least efficient firms – SOEs, while denying the same resources to China’s most efficient 
                                                          
39 The government thought Shanghai-Volkswagen, Dongfeng-Citroen and Guangzhou-Peugeot might 
compete with each other and improve in this process. However, competition was limited, in comparison 
with their collusion of setting high price and delaying product upgrade. 
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firms – private firms. SOEs were beset with internal inefficiencies, while private firms 
lacked resources and property rights to grow and develop. China’s political institutions 
have marginalized the efficient private firms. The discrimination against private firms and 
the preference for SOEs generated the uncompetitiveness of China’s corporate sector in 
the 1980s and much of the 1990s”. The automotive industry is a typical case of this 
situation.  
This may be caused by the essence that the state-owned automotive enterprises 
actually represent the interest of the governments. Nowadays, the presidents of SOEs are 
also regarded as government officials, and are appointed by the government. For example, 
the previous president of Dongfeng was the vice head for automotive industry in the 
Ministry of Machinery Industry before he joined Dongfeng, and then after he left 
Dongfeng he became the mayor of Wuhan City where Dongfeng is based. This situation 
under China’s political and economical environment shows a distorted extreme case of 
the institutional failure of “regulatory capture”40 in the Chinese automotive industry. 
In this “regulatory capture” failure, the government created an imperfect competition 
environment by means of limiting industry entry, imposing trade barriers, shifting costs to 
joint venture partners, etc. However, this uncompetitive environment actually bred the 
inertia of the SOEs, and then these coddled SOEs failed to catch up healthily. Generally 
speaking, the institutional failure is the underlying cause for the market failure that, the 
competence, especially technological capabilities, of indigenous industry failed to 
advance in the past 20 years. This is also the key point that makes difference between 
China’s and Japan’s development trajectories. Japan protected efficient private firms that 
have strong motivations for learning by doing, while China’s governmental regulators 
protected the enterprises owned by them selves. 
In the transition of China’s economy from planning to market-driven, the central 
government has been shifting their adjustment tools from political order and central 
planning to market power. However, the political ownership of some market players, 
                                                          
40 The theory of “regulatory capture” was set out by Richard Posner, an economist and lawyer at the 
University of Chicago, who argued that “Regulation is not about the public interest at all, but is a process, 
by which interest groups seek to promote their private interest ... Over time, regulatory agencies come to be 
dominated by the industries regulated.” From Dictionary of Economics.com, 2006 
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especially the SOEs, still collides with market-based economic principles, and generates 
market failures. In China’s automotive industry, the historical wide existence of the SOEs 
in a reforming market-driven economy generated this Chinese version “regulatory 
capture”, an extreme case of this theory. Theoretically, “regulatory capture” means the 
regulators are captured by the interests that they supposed to regulate (Laffont and Tirole, 
1991; Levine and Forrence, 1990). In China’s automotive industry, the interests the 
regulators are supposed to regulate are the interests of themselves, because the policies 
are made by the government, and the stated-owned enterprises are also owned by the 
government. The industrial policies initially were to develop the industry for the public 
interest, but in actuality the regulation was only for the sake of the SOEs.  
The analysis has indicated that the automotive industrial policies tried to follow the 
basic principles of the infant industry theory, but the strong control of governments on the 
market players through their ownership is the major cause for the fragmentation and 
inefficiency of the industry, as well as the failure of independent capability development 
of the indigenous automotive firms. Therefore, a straight-forward solution for this failure 
is to shed off the government ownership in the current SOEs.  
Actually, by keeping an appropriate stake in the company holdings may help the 
government play a right level of influence for the corporate operations. According to the 
Western industries’ experience, it is unnecessary to completely privatize the current SOEs. 
For example, Volkswagen is still 13.7% owned by the State of Lower Saxony, and 
Renault is also 15.7% owned by French State41. However, holding too much may increase 
over-intervention effects and reduce the robustness of modulations between government 
and the industry, like what has happened in China’s automotive industry.  
The Chinese central government has been attempting to privatize and publicly list (in 
the stock market) many SOEs, and to loosen the relationships between government and 
companies in many industries. However, this has not happened in the automotive sector. 
It is perhaps because the government still regards the automotive industry as a pillar 
industry which should be held in hand firmly.  
                                                          
41 Automotive News Europe (2005). “Guide to Global Automotive Partnerships”, Crain Communications 
Inc, 2006 
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3.6 Regulation Liberation and Effects 
The Chinese government started to reform its automotive industrial policies and 
loosen the regulations over the industry in line with its WTO obligations. Accordingly, a 
few transformative changes have taken place.  
Although the joint venture format is still a must for FDI in the automotive industry, 
local content rate is no longer required. Trade barriers have been lowered in line with 
China’s WTO obligations. The historical automotive import quota was cancelled, and the 
tariff rate for imported entire cars was decreased to 30% on January 1st, 2005, and 
scheduled to drop to 25% by July 1, 2006. The tariff for automotive components and 
parts has been lowered to 30% (Luo, 2005a). More foreign and indigenous private 
investors have been allowed to operate automotive business in China, as shown in Figure 
2.7, especially in the passenger car market. Almost all the major global car companies 
have entered the Chinese automotive market, and more considerably diversified car 
models have been introduced, in comparison with that oligopoly era before 2000 when 
there were very few models available. These changes have increased the competition in 
the domestic market, and driven the companies, including the state-owned firms, 
international joint ventures as well the private firms to improve their product quality and 
design, decrease costs, and lower the price. The improving product attractiveness 
stimulated the car-buying enthusiasm of potential consumers, and served as a major 
driver for the growing private automotive consumption, as illustrated in Figure 3.9, which 
demonstrates the major factors that drive the market growth.  
  80
 Increasing Product Attractiveness
More Localized
Design
Increasing Passenger Car
Consumption
Furious Competition
Emergence of new
Entrants - “Young Tigers”
Regulation Liberation in Line with WTO Commitments Overall Economic Growth
Increasing
Dispensable Income
Lower Price Market GrowthMore New andAdvanced Products
More International
Automakers Rushed In
Entry Limit was LoosenedTrade Barriers WereLowered
Increasing Commercial
Vehicle Consumption
Increasing Logistics,
Construction, etc
Supply Demand
Overcapacity
 
Figure 3.9: Effects of Regulation Liberation and Economic Growth 
Especially, due to the intensifying competition, the international automakers have 
been conducting more local design and development jobs in China, in order to respond to 
the fast changing and expanding market environment. For example, the new 2006 Buick 
LaCrosse China version is a model completely designed and developed by PATAC in 
Shanghai, the joint venture R&D center of GM and SAIC. On the other hand, with the 
encouragement from the government, the SOEs which relied on the joint ventures also 
started to actively “pull” the spillover effect within the joint ventures. In an interview 
during the visits of IMVP researchers in May 2006, a Chinese manager of the ChangAn-
Ford joint venture mentioned that they have a rule in place to rotate the indigenous 
engineers sent from ChangAn’s independent R&D center to the joint venture’s 
engineering center back to ChangAn every four years. Based on these observations, 
deeper technological spillover effect is expected to take place in the joint ventures. 
Moreover, by accumulating the earnings during the golden time of market boom 
from 2000 to 2004, the independent young indigenous automakers have been able to 
originally develop their models independently or by cooperating with international 
designers or technological suppliers. They are enthusiastic in self-reliant product 
development, and pursue a way to technological independence through “learning by 
doing”. With these changes, there have been 89 indigenous passenger car brands as well 
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as 191 models in China’s automotive market in 2005 (Wei, 2005). 
Besides the positive changes that are happening on the supply side (manufacturer), 
the overall economic growth also serves as a key driver for the recent market growth 
from the demand side (consumer), as shown in Figure 3.9. The increase in disposable 
income in the metropolitan areas, and the establishment of an affluent middle class, make 
it happen that the private purchasing has become the mainstream of automotive 
consumption. It has been seen that the population of about 200 million people in the 
“developed China” (the eastern and coastal area of China, especially the big cities) has 
entered the era when family car could prevail. Moreover, the fast overall economic 
development and industrialization also stimulated the demand increase for commercial 
vehicles, which contributes to the recent automotive market growth as well. 
In the mean time, side effects also emerge. As a result of the fast market growth and 
the strong earnings in China, almost all the international automakers, including General 
Motors, Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota, DaimlerChrysler etc., as well as the indigenous 
automotive groups, have been expanding their capacities in China. This has induced a 
rather low capacity utilization rate in the Chinese automotive industry. For the capital-
intensive automotive industry, capacity utilization is a vital performance measure, and 
very sensitive for determining companies’ financial turnouts (Holweg and Pil, 2004). As 
shown in Table 3.4, the capacity utilization in the entire industry is around only 50~60%, 
far below the average utilization in the Western automotive industry around 80% 
(Holweg, Luo and Oliver, 2005). And the capacity utilization rate of the ambitious 
expanding young tigers is incredibly as low as 20%.  
Table 3.4: Capacity Utilization Rate in 2004 
Type of Automaker Capacity Utilization Rate 
International Joint Venture Plants 70.1% 
Independent Plants of Top Five SOEs 50.4% 
Young Tigers 20.2% 
Industry Average 51.3% 
Source: Matthias, Luo and Oliver (2005) 
However, most manufacturers are still increasing their facilities in China. Perhaps 
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from their views, the sustainable growth prospect outweighs the short-term adverse 
financial implications of overcapacity. For example, Volkswagen plans to add an 
investment about €6 billion, and to double its annual production capacity to 1.6 million 
cars in China by 2008. GM also plans to spend over US$ 3 billion to more than double its 
annual production capacity to 1.3 million vehicles by 2007. Local carmaker Geely is also 
planning to increase its capacity from 210,000 to 650,000 by 2007 (KPMG, 2004). Figure 
3.10 is a collection of the announcements on capacity expansions through 2003 to 2004 
from the major automotive manufacturers in China. On the other side, the central 
government has been considering a policy to regulate surplus production by forbidding 
companies with less than 80% capacity utilization rate to establish new plants (FOURIN, 
2006). 
 
Figure 3.10: Planned Additional Production Capacities until 2010 
Source: KPMG (2004); Data were collected by KPMG from company news releases through 
2003 to 2004 
To summarize, the increasing liberation of regulations and the country’s overall 
economic growth have driven the current market growth and the trend in the indigenous 
automakers to promote both technology spillover and learning by doing.  
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is a dynamic and systematic analysis on the reasons for how the 
government policies created the current industrial characteristics in the past two decades. 
Based on the causal analysis conducted in this chapter, the industry-wide 
fragmentation is directly due to the regionalism of local governments and the 
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departmentalism of the different governmental administrations that have automotive 
production operations. The oligopoly of international joint ventures disinclined the 
indigenous firms to develop independent technological capabilities. Without learning 
effects and enough capability developments, the industrial policies based on the infant 
industry theory failed to build strong competitiveness of indigenous firms and led to the 
market dominance of the foreign automakers through the joint ventures. Especially, 
“regulatory capture” was found the major institutional reason for failures of the industrial 
policies. In another word, the industrial polices are “captured” to favor only the SOEs, 
instead of the public and the industry, because the policies are made by the government, 
and the SOEs are also owned by the government. Therefore, the limited resources and 
supports are allocated to the inefficient SOEs, while the efficient but tiny private firms 
have to struggle in front of the strong international joint ventures. Although the catch-up 
responsibility of China’s automotive industry is more likely to be taken on by the 
independent self-reliant indigenous automakers, it is difficult to happen without 
necessary support at their immature stage.  
Generally speaking, the wide existence of SOEs and their complex ownership 
structures generated the complexity of the industry and the difficulty for traditional 
industrial policy tools based on infant industry theory to develop China’s immature 
automotive industry. Also, positive changes have been happening in China’s automotive 
industry with the liberation of regulations and the country’s overall economic 
development. However, an efficient catch-up trend is still unseen in a near future because 
the institutional characteristics are still unchanging in the automotive sector. 
In the next chapter, a comparative study between several countries is conducted to 
further the analysis about the key elements of the infant industry theory and the effects of 
the policy applications of the theory across the countries with different characteristics, in 
order to understand the key but underground factors determining the success or failure of 
the applications of infant industry theory. 
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Chapter 4 Cross-Country Comparison 
 
The basic principles of infant industry theory are applied widely in the industrial 
policies in many developing countries. However, similar policies generated different 
outcomes. The analyses in forgoing chapters have found that the governmental 
institutions and political environment in China are a major determinant factor for the 
effectiveness of the industrial policies. In this chapter, we will compare the policies, 
economic and political environments, and the policy impacts in the automotive industries 
of Brazil, Japan and China in order to further the exploration for the fundamental factors 
that determine the success or failure of the policies based on the infant industry theory. 
Especially, it is meaningful to compare the three countries because: 
• The three countries were typical latecomers to the automotive industry. This is 
especially true of Spain which is similar to Brazil, and South Korea which is 
similar to Japan in terms of development strategy and trajectory. China is a 
combination of the both types. 
• Japan and China’s governments had a similar policy intention that was to develop 
the indigenous capability of domestic firms. 
• Brazil and China’s governments had a similar catch-up strategy that was to take 
advantage of the foreign investments. 
• Similar general trade policies were used to protect the domestic automotive 
industries in the three countries.  
The time periods compared in this study are the first 20 to 30 years of the initial 
automotive industry take-offs stimulated by the governmental policies in these countries. 
During their different take-off periods, the automotive industries in these countries grew 
from infant to a rather mature and stable stage. 
4.1 Brazilian Automotive Industry -- FDI and Import Substitution 
The Brazil government started to develop its automotive industry from 1956 when 
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Jucelino Kubitschek42 became the president of Brazil. In order to turn Brazil from an 
agriculture country to an industrialized country, he implemented an ambitious plan to 
increase the industrial output, create employments, and substitute import for industrial 
goods, in order to make “fifty years of progress in five”. In this plan for national 
economic leap-frog and fast industrialization, the automotive industry was selected as one 
of the core industries to initiate, promote and pull the country’s overall industrialization. 
The economic plan in the automotive industry sector was materialized by the means of 
import tariffs, currency reevaluations and other policies to protect the domestic industry, 
as well as absorbing FDI in order to bring in financial and technological resources. The 
five years of Kubitschek’s presidency were also the first five years of the initial growth of 
the Brazilian automotive industry.  
On one hand, since the mid-1950s, stringent trade barriers, such as high tariffs, had 
been imposed to protect the domestic market in consistence with the import substitution 
strategy of the government. In the 1970s, the Brazilian automotive industry had formed 
rather big scale and capability. Facing the energy crisis and huge debt, the government 
took detailed measures to promote export while continuing restricting import. For 
example, since 1972, the export had been subsidized at a rate 26%~36%, and supported 
with preferential loans. On the other hand, only companies that exported could have the 
right to import, and could only import 1/3 value of their exports (Ding, 1985). Under 
those policies, Brazil exported vehicles with a value of approximate 1 billion US dollars, 
and the exports reached the record of 417,000 units by the year of 1979 (Lai, 2001).  
On the other hand, FDI was promoted by the government to bring in technologies, 
experience and capitals into the automotive sector, facing the small domestic market size, 
poor industrial experience, and limited capital and technology resources. For example, 
during the initial establishment year, sales tax and equipment import tax were exempted, 
and preferential loans were offered for foreign-invested automotive companies. And, 
foreign investors could have 100% share of the companies. Since the 1950s, Volkswagen, 
General Motors, Ford and Fiat were the first wave of investors. 
                                                          
42 Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1902~1976) was the President of Brazil from 1956 to 1961. Wikipedia, 
June 2006. 
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But conditions and restrictions were also implemented together with these supports 
for FDI to manufacture automobiles in Brazil. For example, the foreign-invested 
companies were commanded to have local content rate about 35%~50% initially and 
increase it to 95% in three years (Lai, 2001). Otherwise, the company would be ruled out 
of the business. When the production volume reached a level high enough, import would 
be forbidden and the equipment for new expansion of plants must be locally produced. 
Also, no more than 12% of the profits were allowed to be transferred out of Brazil. And 
the profits made by FDI companies were encouraged to re-invest in Brazil (Ding, 1985).  
On a rather poor foundation of industrial experience, a fast industrial growth was 
fostered by these policy measures. As shown in Figure 4.1, the automotive production 
volume grew from 134,051 units in 1960 to 1,165,174 units in 1980, No.10 in the world, 
and accounted 12% of the Brazilian national industrial output value (Ding, 1985). The 
automotive industry became a real pillar industry for the economy in Brazil. Although 
there were obvious fluctuations in the 1980s, the overall industrial strength has leaped up 
to a relatively mature stage. 
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Figure 4.1: Vehicle Production, Domestic Sales and Exports in Brazil (1960~1996) 
Source: AAMA, World Motor Vehicle Data, 1998,  
Another success is the government’s ethanol program from 1975 to date. By law, all 
the gasoline in Brazil contains a minimum of 25 percent ethanol. With government 
subsidies on ethanol cars until the mid-1990s, nowadays most cars in Brazil have run on 
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either ethanol or dual-fuel (ethanol or gasoline) engines. In 2005, 80% of the cars 
produced in Brazil were dual-fuel43. Ethanol fuel can be produced from sugarcane, which 
is widely available in Brazil, at a lower cost than traditional gasoline. Since its inception 
in 1975, the ethanol program has displaced imported oil worth $120 billion (Morris, 
2005). This popularity of ethanol cars in Brazil is a success of the government policies to 
promote industrial development with local characteristics.  
However, most of the cars, including the cars with ethanol or duel-fuel engines, are 
still mainly produced with foreign technologies and brands. The Brazilian indigenous 
automakers, such as Gurgel, Agrale, Engesa, Scania and Mafersa, have very limited 
production and sales volumes, as well as technological capabilities. The current Brazilian 
automotive industry is 95%, in terms of assets, controlled by the FDI, and domestically 
produced car models are still outdated and sold at high prices. The industry, especially the 
indigenous firms, is still in lack of the international-level competence. Even though these 
problems are there, the governmental industrial policies should still be regarded as 
successful because the initial purpose to substitute import and industrialize the country 
has been realized. 
4.2 Japanese Automotive Industry -- Learning By Doing and Catching 
Up 
After the World War II, the Japanese government implemented comprehensive 
industrial policies to recover its economy. Japan had extensive industrialization 
experience before the World War II, but it was a latecomer compared with West Europe 
and America in the automotive sector. At that time, the automotive industry was selected 
by the government as a strategic industry to foster, and the industrial policies applied in 
the automotive industry clearly followed the infant industry theory that had successfully 
been used by United States and Germany to catch up with Britain by the turn of the 19th 
century. The automotive industrial policies in Japan from 1955 to 1985 created a classical 
case of the application of the infant industry theory in the automotive industry.  
On one hand, the Japanese government provided active supports directly to the 
                                                          
43 “Ethanol Fuel in Brazil”, Wikipedia, June 2006 
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indigenous companies in the forms of preferential loans, tax reduction as well subsidies 
(equipment or financial subsidy). For example, the national banks in Japan offered 
preferential loans 90 billion Yen in 1953, 133 Billion Yen in 1954, and 163 Billion Yen in 
1955, which accounted 20%, 19.3% and 24.9% of the fixed investments to the indigenous 
automotive firms in the three years. From 1961 to 1965, 32.1% of the preferential loans 
for the manufacturing industries went into the automotive sector (Zhang, Liu and Lu, 
2004). Tax reductions were conducted through the “Special Tax Act”. Based on this act, 
from 1951 to 1959, 18.4% of the new investment of 63.45 billion Yen was applied as 
depreciation so as to save the corporate tax for the companies. Afterwards, the level of 
supports decreased along with the maturation of the indigenous firms (Shi, 2005).  
Meanwhile, a few protectionism trade polices were also implemented in order to 
isolate the domestic market from the foreign competition after defining the automotive 
industry as a national capital to protect. The concrete measures include the forbiddance of 
FDI, import tariff, import quota, as well as some non-tariff/quota barriers. Before the 
mid-1960s, the import tariff was over 40%, first value-based, later unit-based.  
The government interventions through industrial policies led to the competition 
between the indigenous big companies, industrial scale economy, and the wide range of 
improvements in management and technologies for catch-up, and etc. The growth of 
competitiveness of Japanese automotive industry, and the dynamically adjusted industrial 
policies demonstrated a perfect and successful practice of the infant industry theory.  
The speed of the Japanese firms to improve their production efficiency and to lower 
costs was very high. When the domestic firms reached a certain level of competitiveness 
by the end of the 1960s, the protectionism policies started to loose. Afterwards the 
restriction on FDI was lifted in 1973. With this trend, the internal preferential loans and 
subsidies were also given up by the government. The domestic market was no longer 
protected. Figure 4.2 below shows the relationship between the import tariff and the 
industry’s international competitiveness. The indicator of international competitiveness is 
the export rate (export/total production).  
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Figure 4.2: Import Tariff Adjusted with Exportation Rate in Japan 
Source: Shi (2005) 
The Japanese automotive industry took off from 1955, and was widely regarded as 
becoming mature in the mid-1980s. From 1955 to 1985, the automotive production 
jumped 160 times in Japan. The continuous rise of vehicle production, sales and exports 
from 1955 to 1985 is shown in Figure 4.3. Then, declines took place from the late 1980s. 
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Figure 4.3: Vehicle Production, Domestic Sales, Exports and Imports in Japan (1955~2000) 
Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) 
The import into the Japanese domestic vehicle market has remained negligible from 
the beginning, as shown in Figure 4.3. Although the vehicle tariff has been reduced to 
zero, it is still difficult for the U.S. automakers to improve their access to the Japan 
market. And the actual reasons include not only the improved competitiveness of Japan-
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made cars over the cars made by the U.S. and European automakers, but also some strict 
non-tariff barriers44.   
The success of Japan’s industrial policies was obvious. In 1955, the vehicle 
production was only 69,000 units, 0.28% of which were exported, and the output value 
contributed only 2.9% for the manufacturing industries. Japan became a major leader of 
the global automotive industry after 30 years of rapid catch-up. In 1985, Japan produced 
12.27 million automobiles, 54.8% of which were exported. The export amount ranked 
No.1 in the world. Meanwhile, the imports were only about 50 thousand units though 
import tariff has been lifted. In 1985, the automotive industrial output value accounted 
for 11.8% of the total output value of manufacturing industries. 7.65 million People 
worked in the automobile or automobile-associated industries, and accounted for 7% of 
the total employment among the manufacturing industries. The progress from 1955 to 
1985 is given in Table 4.1. The automotive industry played a particularly important role 
to drive the recovery of the economy in Japan after the World War II. 
Table 4.1: The Japanese Automotive Industry Leap from 1955 to 1985 
Year 1955 1985 
Employment 1,270 7.65 million 
Production 69 thousand 12.27 million 
Export Rate (Export/Production) 1.8% 54.8% 
Import Rate (Import/Production) 10.5% 1.0% 
Prod. Value Contribution Ratio in Manufacturing Industries 2.91% 11.8% 
Export Contribution Ratio in Manufacturing Industries 0.28% 26% 
                                                          
44 A broad range of non-tariff barriers are in place to keep Japan as a closed market with 0% tariff. For 
example, unique safety and emission standards are imposed on imported cars, and require imported cars to 
do expensive modifications. And the certification of imported vehicles is costly & difficult. A few vehicle 
sale-related taxes, including consumption tax, annual engine-displacement based tax and acquisition tax 
based on vehicle size and use, impact more on imported motor vehicles than domestic vehicles. The 
discriminatory standards and taxes unfairly increased the final sale prices of imported cars. Moreover, 
restricted distribution arrangements also prevail in Japan between Japanese automakers and domestic 
dealers, and prevent dealers establishing contractual relationships with foreign automakers. In addition, the 
Japanese government’s sophisticated currency manipulation (weak Yen policy) also gave exporters huge 
subsidies while discouraging imports into Japan’s domestic market. There are also many other non-tariff 
barriers that increase the costs of selling imported cars in Japan. See Statement of The Automotive Trade 
Policy Council, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 2005 
(http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3798) and Statement of Mustafa 
Mohatarem, Ph.D., Chief Economist, General Motors, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, September 28, 2005 (http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3798)  
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Employment Contribution Ratio in Manufacturing Industries 2.56% 7% 
Investment Contribution Ratio in Manufacturing Industries 2.85% 20% 
Source: Foreign Trade Status 1967, Ministry of Finance of Japan; Industry Statistics Table 
1997, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan. 
4.3 Comparison of Automotive Industries in Brazil, Japan and China 
A comparative study is conducted with various factors concerned in the aspects of 
economic and political environment, industrial policy and its intention, impact and 
development trajectory in the three representative countries - Brazil, Japan and China. 
Together with the data, information and findings analyzed in the foregoing chapters about 
China, the comparison and findings are summarized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Summarization of the Cross-country Policy Comparison 
 Brazil Japan China 
Economic and 
Political 
Environment 
   
Take-off 
Periods 1956~1980 1955~1985 1985~2005 
Foundation of 
Industrialization 
Experience  
Poor Good 
Limited experience in the 
truck sector with the help 
from the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s. 
Market 
Environment 
Steady domestic market 
development 
Domestic market explosion 
and military vehicle demand 
from the Korean War 
Domestic market 
explosion since “Econ 
Reform and Open” 
Major Market 
Players 
FDI, with few 
indigenous firms Indigenous Private Firms 
Int’l JVs in passenger car 
industry and SOEs 
Role of 
Government Centralized order 
Centralized management 
and coordination 
Decentralized 
management in form of 
orders, Regionalism, 
Departmentalism 
Policies    
Basic Intentions 
Industrialization, 
import substitution and 
creating employment 
To develop the industry with 
self-reliant capability 
To develop the industry 
with self-reliant 
capability 
Basic Strategies Protection + FDI 
Protection + In-house 
competition + Learning by 
Doing 
Protection + Forced 
Spillover from FDI 
(”Bargaining Market for 
Technology”) 
FDI Favored Forbidden Favored 
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Protected 
Objects FDI Indigenous Private Firms  
Joint Ventures b/w SOEs 
and FDI; Indigenous 
private firms were ruled 
out 
Policy Support 
for Indigenous 
Capability 
Development 
Unseen Subsidy, tax reduction and low rate loan 
Joint ventures must have 
technical centers 
Import Tariff: High High High 
Policy 
Impacts    
Competition  Oligopoly of FDI Strong competition b/w indigenous private firms 
Oligopoly of IJVs and 
SOEs 
Learning Effects Weak Successful Learning by Doing Weak 
Indigenous 
Technological 
Capabilities 
Underdeveloped World Level Underdeveloped 
Indigenous 
Brands Weak World Level Weak 
Market Share of 
the Indigenous 
Brands 
<5% in 2003 >95% in 2004 
<30% of passenger car 
market and gather at low 
end in 2005 
Industrial Size 
(Production) 
1.17 million units in 
1980 12.27 millions units in 1985 5.71 million units in 2005 
Industrial 
Importance  
12% of the overall 
industrial output in 
1980 
11.8% of manufacturing 
industries in 1985 
3% of the overall 
industrial output in 2005 
Export 25% in 1994 54.8% in 1985 3% in 2005 
Overall 
Evaluation 
   
 Succeed in goal – 
 
Policy purposes have 
been achieved although 
indigenous capability 
was underdeveloped 
Succeed in goal -  
 
Protection stimulated take-
off, then the indigenous 
firms grew from tiny to be 
globally-competent 
Fail in goal - 
 
Indigenous firms became 
cash-rich but still weak in 
core competitiveness 
(technology and brand) 
Source: Summarized and compiled from various sources 
The three countries had different industrial foundations when they started to use the 
industrial policies to drive the automotive industry to take off. When the Cultural 
Revolution in China was ended in the late 1970s, the very little experience of the Chinese 
automotive enterprises was mostly concentrated in the truck manufacturing sector when 
the industrial policies were first enacted. Both China and Brazil had little industrialization 
experience while the industrialization experience of Japan accumulated prior to World 
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War II still existed even though the facilities were almost destroyed in the War. That is 
partly the reason why Japan had the confidence to solely develop the domestic industry 
on its own, while China and Brazil pinned the hope on FDI and its associated spillover 
effects.  
Market demand is an important prerequisite for developing scale economy. In these 
three countries, the market booms during their industrial take-off periods supported the 
automotive enterprises to develop. From 1955 to 1980, the registered vehicles in Brazil 
increased 42 times from 337, 385 to 37,873,898 vehicles, the same 42 times from 
900,797 to 37,873,898 in Japan. Especially, the market size boomed 180 times in Japan 
from 1950 to 1970 (Shi, 2005). All the domestic Japanese companies continued to invest 
and expand production capacities during that time in order to capture the market shares. 
Similar market size expansion exists in China due to the overall economic growth. If the 
domestic market size is small, different strategy should be made like what was in South 
Korea. 
All the three countries selected automotive industry as a break-in point to foster, and 
expected its strong association and spillover potential could help pull the overall 
economic growth. However, although the ambition to develop was the same and the trade 
policies were similarly implemented, the policy intentions and strategies varied across the 
countries. The governments in Japan and China addressed their intensions to develop 
indigenous technological capabilities, while the Brazilian regulators only expected the 
automobiles could be manufactured, and employment opportunities and tax incomes 
could be generated domestically. The later strategy of FDI promotion and import 
substitution exactly followed the policy intension of the Brazilian government in the 
1950s. For Japan, with good industrialization foundation, they insisted in an in-house 
self-reliant capability development strategy. The joint venture regulation on FDI in China 
integrated the need for help from outside at that poor foundation and the ambition to 
obtain indigenous know-know directly and quickly. 
Therefore, FDI was banned in Japan, but favored in Brazil and China. Regarding 
who were protected and supported, they are very different in the three countries. In Brazil, 
foreign-invested companies were the main body of the automotive industry. In Japan, it is 
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the indigenous private firm. However in China, again it is a little more complicated as the 
major players protected and favored by the government were the joint ventures between 
the foreign companies and local SOEs. The government promoted the international joint 
ventures, but banned domestic private investments and independent FDI. Obviously, what 
the government truly intended to protect and foster were the SOEs. The support that FDI 
obtained was indirectly through their local joint venture partners. And the private firms 
had no chance to produce cars in China until 1997. 
Because of the simple policy intention to bring FDI into the domestic market to make 
cars at home, the Brazilian government invested no serious effort to promote indigenous 
technological capability development. Even though the ethanol or dual-fuel cars are 
successfully promoted in Brazil, the technology providers are still the major international 
automakers. In China, due to the preference of the government, the support and 
promotions for R&D activities were only given to the joint ventures. In Japan, the 
situation was clear that the indigenous private firms were supported to pursue original 
R&D.  
After the first 20~30 years of protection and fostering, the automotive industries in 
the three countries experienced different trajectories. The Brazilian industrial policies 
achieved its goal. The automotive industry has accounted about 12% of total industrial 
output value of the nation, and generated millions of employment opportunities by the 
1980s. Although the export still cannot compete with those of Japan and South Korea, at 
least the import has been successfully substituted by domestic productions. The 
automotive industry development drove the Brazilian overall economy. Although the 
indigenous technological capability has not been established, and the Brazil-made cars 
are still almost foreign brands, these facts were actually not pursued in the initial policy 
purposes. In this study, because they reached the initial goals, the Brazilian automotive 
industrial policies were justified as successful although they did not follow the track 
which the infant industry theory designs. 
The development of Japan’s automotive industry was a perfect application of the 
infant industry theory that has been widely written in textbooks. The Japanese 
government did all the theory says, and achieved all the theory expects. With the 
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protection that was later lifted when becoming unnecessary, the Japanese indigenous 
firms, such as Toyota, Honda and Nissan, have grown from tiny to be globally-competent. 
Especially, many unique innovations in production management techniques and product 
technologies were created in their “learning by doing” process to pursue independent 
capabilities. These capabilities belong to themselves, and can sustain their future growth. 
This is truly a growth process from infant to mature. 
The China case in this study was complicated in terms of both the economic and 
political environments and the policies. The hybrid policy of joint venture regulation is a 
presentation of their hybrid strategic purpose. The government wanted a short cut to 
achieve independent capabilities through the spillover and learning effects in the joint 
ventures. In the first 20 years of implementations, the industrial policies in China have 
not achieved the initial goal – to foster the indigenous firms to be able to play with the 
major international automakers on the same stage. The protected indigenous SOEs have 
become cash-rich, but still weak in core competitiveness, in particular technology and 
brand, and still have to rely on technology indraughts from outside.  
As we have analyzed in Section 3.4.2, “learning by doing” is crucial for fully 
accomplishing the independent capabilities of the learners. By looking at the trajectories 
of the Japanese and Brazilian automotive industries, we can clearly see that the “learning-
by-doing” pursuit made the difference in the formations of these two industries, though 
their trade protectionism polices were generally similar. In terms of China, the 
government tried to use a comprehensive set of policies to pursue independent 
capabilities, but the indigenous firms did not pursue “learning by doing” well.  
Let us use an analog to summarize the growth stories of the automotive industries in 
the three countries. The simple logic is that, an infant bird who sits on the back of other 
flying birds is not truly flying, and if it never practices flying by itself, it will never be 
able to fly. The Japanese automotive firms (which were infant birds) successfully learned 
how to fly with the protection of their “bird mother” (the government), so they can now 
fly. The Brazilian mother bird (the government) regarded the birds that fly to its nest 
(international automakers) as its own babies. For the Chinese, the mother bird 
(government) shares the nest and food with a bigger bird (international automakers), and 
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wants it to teach its favored infant baby bird (SOEs) how to fly. However, the bigger bird 
pretends to teach, but does not want the baby bird to fully learn flying because the bigger 
bird wants to stay in the nests and keep enjoying the food. On the other hand, the baby 
bird (SOEs) was lazy to learn how to fly due to the dotage of its mother (government), 
also because it can always go out into the air by sitting on the back of the bigger bird. 
Nonetheless, an infant bird will never be able to fly without practicing independently.  
Back to the actual world, as a matter of fact, the difference of the prevalence of 
“learning by doing” between Japan and China was further due to the difference of the 
targets protected by the industrial policies. The Japanese policies supported the 
entrepreneurial private companies, while the Chinese policies supports were focused on 
the inefficient SOEs tied with the governments. Private firms are market-driven, and 
operate according to the market theories, while SOEs are driven by the government. The 
system of SOEs and industrial policies is not robust because it lacks the ability to self 
adjust, as opposed to the positive interactions between the governmental policies and the 
private firms that could complement each other. 
In the Chinese automotive industry, the major market players - the SOEs, are actually 
part of the government system, and the government is the manager or controller for them. 
In Japan, the government cannot control the major players - the private firms, instead, the 
government played a role of coordinator or assistant in the industry where the private 
firms determine their own strategies. This judgment could be demonstrated by the story 
about the “grouplization” plan of the Japanese government in 1961 (Zhang, Liu and Lu, 
2004).  
In 1961, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of the Japanese 
government planed to group the domestic companies into three categories: two mass 
production enterprises, three luxury passenger car enterprises, and one light weight 
vehicle enterprise, for the purpose to create a scale economy45. But this tentative plan was 
given up because of the strong oppositions from the private companies. At that time, 
finally the Japanese government neither forced the firms to merger, nor limited private 
                                                          
45 The later policy of “Three Big, Three Small and Mini Two” in China was similar with this tentative 
grouplization policy in Japan. 
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investors to enter the automotive industry. This story indicated the pilot role of 
government, but the corporate strategy was always decided by the firm itself. Afterwards, 
in the Japanese automotive industry, several big business groups were formed naturally 
by market forces instead of the government administration. The system of coordination 
and cooperation between the government and private sectors successfully balanced and 
bridged the need from the private sector and the supply from the government in Japan. 
Rather than an order or control, the industrial policy worked as a tool of the government 
to complement the weakness or inefficiency of the market force, especially in the aspect 
of fostering industrial leap frog.  
Without the market force to drive, the SOEs in China had little motivation to learn by 
doing, so they are still incapable of doing independent product development, and have to 
continually rely on the international automakers under the governments’ joint venture 
regulation. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter compared the industrial policies for development purpose, the 
environments of use, as well as the final policy impacts in the automotive industry across 
three representative countries -- Brazil, Japan and China.  
Through the comparison, it is found that, the difference of attitudes toward “learning 
by doing”, which is crucial for independent capability development, led to the distinct 
development trajectories of the automotive industries in the three countries, although 
similar protections were used to foster the industry take-off. Based on the comparative 
analysis, the institutional difference of the market players is justified as the substantial 
reason for the success and failures of the industrial polices of the three countries. The 
major market players are international automakers in Brazil, private firms in Japan, and 
SOEs and their joint ventures with the international automakers in China. This conclusion 
has reinforced the findings in foregoing chapters. 
Chapter 5 will conclude this thesis, propose policy recommendations and provide 
ideas and directions for future work.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Future 
Work 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
A systematic analysis on China’s evolving automotive industry was conducted to 
understand the dynamics between governmental policies and industry developments as 
well as the influence of economic and political environments.  
The overall industrial characteristics were analyzed in chapter 2 and summarized as 
below: 
• The motor vehicle market grew rapidly in the past two decades, and the trend has 
shown the huge potential of sustainability;  
• The Chinese automotive industry is fragmented, and diseconomy of scale exists; 
• Political power determines the allocation of capital and resources to SOEs; 
• Historical lack of technological capabilities remains, and the reliance of SOEs on 
foreign partners’ product indraught continues; 
• Foreign brands dominate the passenger car market; 
• Private-owned firms started to emerge after the liberation of regulations. 
Through 20 years of protection and fostering, the government policies failed to 
establish a mature indigenous industry that has a competitiveness at the international 
level. The industrial policies were designed in accordance with the ideas of infant 
industry theory, but the practice was unsuccessful in the case of China’s automotive 
industry.  
The industrial policies in China had strong interactions with the economic and 
political environments of the automotive industry in transition. Therefore, a systematic 
causal analysis was conducted to explore the essential reasons for the distorted policy 
impacts on the industrial evolution. The major findings include:  
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• Before 1997, all the indigenous automotive manufacturers were owned by various 
governmental agencies and different levels of local governments. Over time, the 
regionalism of local governments and the departmentalism of agencies of the 
central government led to the fragmentation and diseconomy in China’s 
automotive industry.  
• The infant industry theory is based on a dynamic view. Static protection induces 
negative effects and dead weight loss for the industry and the nation, but the 
protection may also generate the chance for immature firms to survive, and to 
stimulate domestic capability development and efficiency improvements. The 
purpose of the theory is to develop the infant industry, and the internal 
improvement of indigenous capabilities is the key to achieve this purpose. 
• In the Chinese automotive industry, the oligopoly of the international joint 
ventures generated by the protection weakened the motivation of the SOEs to 
learn through the technology spillover process, and to learn by “doing” 
independently. Since the necessary learning effects for capability development 
were limited, the policies failed to complete a successful catch-up of the infant 
industry.  
• The deeper reason for the oligopoly and the passiveness of SOEs was found as an 
institutional failure - “regulatory capture” - what the government regulators 
protected are the enterprises of their own. The governmental ownership in the 
market players is the fundamental reason for the failure of industrial policies for a 
development pursuit.  
• The liberation of protectionism regulations since the late 1990s had positive 
effects on the market maturation and sustainable growth. However, due to the 
unchanged institutional features, in particular the strong governmental ownership 
within the industry players, an efficient catch-up trend is still unseen in a near 
future. 
The cross-country comparative study in Chapter 4 supports these findings above. The 
successful “learning by doing” served as the major driver for Japan’s automotive industry 
to develop its indigenous capabilities, and to rapidly catch up in the 20 years since the 
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mid-1950s. And the healthy competition in the domestic market encouraged the 
innovative capability development in terms of production techniques and product 
development. The institutional difference makes the difference of policy impacts between 
Japan and China. The Japanese government protected efficient private-owned firms that 
have modulating actions in response to the industrial policies and market environment 
changes, while the government in China protected inefficient enterprises that represent 
the government’s own interest. Unlike the decentralized management over the automotive 
industry across ministries and regional governments in China, MITI in Japan had strong 
power to oversee the industry, and played a successful coordinating role in stead of a 
controller’s role. 
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
Given the failures of the industrial policies, the institutional deficit of the government 
structures with the industry, and the economic and political environment, several 
measures are proposed based on the analysis and findings. 
• The ownership structure of the current SOEs should be reformed. The government 
needs to reduce its holdings in SOEs by ways of privatizing or listing publicly, for 
the purpose of loosening the ties between government and companies in the 
industry. This may increase the modulation actions of the companies towards the 
industrial policies, and reduce the chance for the regionalism and departmentalism 
of government agencies to play negative effects. 
• A powerful government unit that could oversee the current agencies owning 
automotive enterprises, similar with MITI46 in Japan, should be constructed to 
coordinate the conflicts between policies and the industrial characteristics, and the 
conflicts between the government and the industry players. It may also be useful 
to promote the mergers and acquisitions between the inefficient companies that 
belong to different governmental administrations in the current fragmented 
                                                          
46 MITI - Ministry of International Trade and Industry was the single most powerful agency in the Japanese 
government. At the height of its influence, it ran Japan as a centrally-managed economy, funding research 
and directing investment. In 2001, its role was taken over by the newly created METI - Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry. Wikipedia, June 2006. 
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automotive industry in China. 
• The governmental policies should be adjusted to be fair to both the SOEs and the 
private-owned but efficient firms, if the SOEs continue to remain in the industry. 
The government should leave the market to determine which enterprises are more 
promising and deserve growth. Especially, private firms are market-driven and 
able to mitigate the possible negative effects of the industrial policies. Conversely, 
SOE is just part of the government system, and has no power or mechanism to 
correct the possible mistakes of the government.  
• The government should encourage and support the self-reliant research and 
development activities (learning by doing), as well as innovations in production 
techniques and product technologies with concrete benefits, such as tax reduction, 
subsidy or preferential loan. Independent capability development is crucial for the 
catch-up of indigenous industry and the future independent development without 
the product indraught from joint venture partners.  
Finally, we would emphasize that, these recommendations are theoretical and subject 
to many practical conditions in actual use, and the impact would take some time to 
happen in such a complex and large scale industry. 
Generally speaking, appropriate degree of governmental protection and fostering is 
necessary for China’s immature indigenous automotive industry. However, it should not 
be forgotten that the purpose to protect is to nurture the capability development. Without 
this to be achieved, sole protection would generate harmful effects on the industry and 
especially the consumers. It is also important to notice, even though industrial policy is 
important, it should not act like a military order that replaces the market power. Instead, 
its role should be a measure to complement the deficit of pure market mechanism in 
optimizing resource allocation and nurturing immature firms, as well as a bridge between 
the government and the industry. Especially, for an automotive industry with a production 
and demand volume about 6 million and a growth rate of 15% per year, the government 
should play a role of an architect to establish a fair and harmonious competitive 
environment, an arbiter on conflicts and problems, rather than a regulator or controller. 
  102
5.3 Future Work 
The research approaches and findings still could be improved in the future, especially 
in the following aspects: 
• In the current study, a large amount of data has been widely used to illustrate the 
corporate and industrial characteristics, but the causal analysis is still basically 
qualitative, and based on existing facts and judgments from outside sources or 
personal knowledge accumulation. The conclusions and findings may be more 
solid if quantitative system dynamics analysis could be conducted in the future. 
• Due to limited time and resources, data and information used in this study were 
mainly from readings and yearbooks. If wider and deeper interviews, surveys and 
data collections could be done in the future and deepened to corporate level, the 
understanding on company performances and strategies could be furthered.  
• A cross-industry comparison could be helpful as well. Some other industries, such 
as China’s television industry, have successfully caught up with the international 
level, and formed strong competitiveness. To analyze the industrial policies used 
in these industries and their impacts could be beneficial for improving the 
industrial policies in the automotive sector. 
• China’s automotive industry has entered a new stage very different from two 
decades ago. Both the industry and the policies are changing rapidly. To follow up 
those changes and related impacts may help understand the actions of infant 
industry theory in new economic and political environments. 
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Appendix B: Summary of the Chinese Automotive Industry 
Policy 1994 
1 Policy Objectives To open up domestic and foreign markets; promotion of large scale 
production; concentration of the industry, eliminating small scale, 
dispersed operations 
2 Product Approval Automotive enterprises must submit future product plans for approval; 
products which are not approved cannot be sold, imported or used 
3 Enterprise 
Organization 
Formation of automotive industry groups to attain critical mass; state 
support for enterprises which exceed certain production volumes and R&D 
effort 
4 Technology Policy Encouragement of independent product development 
5 Investment Policy  Encouragement of automotive enterprises to raise development funds from 
various sources; trans-regional and trans-departmental investment to 
support increased industry concentration 
6 Foreign 
Investment Policy 
Encouragement of joint ventures with foreign partners who meet certain 
conditions (e.g. technology must be 1990s standards; R&D facilities must 
be established; foreign partner must have independent product patents and 
trademarks, and have a good-capital raising ability 
7 Import 
Management 
Policy 
Restriction of imports; entry points limited to four seaports; prohibition of 
imports of used vehicles  
8 Export 
Management 
Policy 
Expansion of exports as production rises; priority loans for enterprises 
whose exports exceed 3-8% of annual sales volume for passenger cars 
9 Localization 
Policy 
Prohibition of knock-down kits; preferential tax rates for enterprises with 
high localisation rates 
10 Consumption and 
Pricing Policy 
Encouragement of individual ownership of automobiles; prices of civilian 
vehicles (except saloons) to be decided by enterprises according to market 
demand. Prices of saloons to follow the state guide price. 
11 Policies on Related 
Industries and 
Social Insurance 
Co-ordination and development of supporting industries (metals, materials, 
capital equipment, electronics, rubber, plastics and glass).  Infrastructure 
development 
12 Industry Policy 
Planning and 
Project 
Management 
Localities and departments to support the Industry Policy; no new complete 
car facilities to be approved during 1994-95 
Source: The State Planning Committee of China (1994). “Automotive Industry Policy”. 
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Appendix C: Summary of the Chinese Automotive Industry 
Policy 2004 
1 Policy Objectives Insisting on the principle of combing market theory and government 
macro planning;  
Promotion of the harmonious development of the automotive and 
associated industries;  
Driving industrial structural adjustment; 
Enhancing economy of scale and concentration of the industry; 
Encouragement of self-reliant product development and local brand 
development, aiming to build up a few famous brands and world-level 
(top 500) automotive groups before 2010;  
To become one of the major global automotive production countries and 
to export in big volume; 
Fostering the development of local suppliers, and encouraging the 
participation of global competition. 
2 Development 
Planning 
Management 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) makes the 
mid/long term strategic plan for the industry in accordance with this 
policy;  
The big automotive enterprises (with > 15% market share) should make 
the strategic plans of their own in according with the strategic plan of 
NDRC with the authorization of NDRC. 
3 Technology Policy Insisting on the principle of combing technology transfer and self-reliant 
product development; 
Encouragement of light duty and fuel-efficient cars; 
Promotion of the R&D and commercialization of battery-powered 
electrical vehicles, hybrids and fuel cell vehicles;  
Promotion of the use of alternative fuels including methanol, ethanol, 
natural gas and etc. 
4 Industrial Structure 
Adjustment 
Encouragement of formation of big automotive groups (with > 15% 
market share) or alliance; 
Encouragement of global cooperation and operation of local automotive 
enterprise; 
Encouragement of international acquisition or merger; 
Separation of the part division from assemblers; 
Setting up regulations for withdrawing. 
5 Entry Management To constitute ‘Bylaw of Motor Vehicle Management’; 
To constitute compelling automotive product standard criteria for safety, 
emission, fuel efficiency and etc.;  
To uniform the management systems for the entries of automotive 
enterprises and products. 
6 Brand Strategy To encourage self-property products, emphasize intellectual property 
protection, and improve local brand reputation; 
Encouragement of strategic planning on local brand development and 
protection; 
All the automotive parts and assemblies produced in China should be 
labeled with brands and production locations. 
  110
7 Product 
Development 
Encouragement and support of establishments of R&D centres in 
automotive enterprises for improving independent product innovation 
capabilities; 
Encourage the involvement of assemblers and suppliers in national R&D 
projects. 
8 Part Industry Encouraging suppliers into the product development activities within 
assemblers; 
To form advanced R&D and manufacturing capability and enter the 
international market;  
To encourage various sources of funds entering the part industry. 
9 Distribution and 
Sales Network 
Development 
Encouragement of learning mature international automotive sales modes; 
Encouragement of the establishment of local brand product sales and 
service systems; 
Passenger car sales and service should be licensed from manufactures and 
distributed by brands from 2005, all autos from 2006. 
10 Investment Chinese share holding in whole car assembly enterprises must be no less 
than 50%, but not applying to exportation-targeted projects;  
Investment on establishing new automotive assembly enterprise must be 
no less than 2 billion Yuan. 
11 Import 
Management 
 
Support on localization of foreign products; 
Restriction of imports;  
Entry points limited to four seaports and two land ports;  
Prohibition of bonded service for imported automobiles in bonded areas of 
the import ports from 2005; 
Prohibition of imports of used vehicles. 
12 Automotive 
Consumption and 
Use 
 
Encouragement of automobile credit consumption; 
Improving the automobile insurance policies 
Encouragement of well regulated used car circulation and transactions; 
Encouragement of private car consumption; 
Prohibition of extra administration fee and government foundation raising; 
Encouragement of light duty, low emission and efficient cars.  
Prohibition of the discriminative policies on non-local produced 
automobile products; 
Encouragement of private investments on parking plots and other 
infrastructures. 
To constitute national uniform automotive emission standards. 
To constitute national uniform motor vehicle registration, inspection and 
management system. 
Source: China National Development and Reform Commission (2004). “New Automotive 
Industry Policy”.  
